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Introduction 
In today’s fast-growing world, the crises and the failures of economic policy run by 
governments in many countries are very common and very often unfavorable for ordinary people, 
who live at or under minimum living wage. Russian citizens are not an exception, and most of 
them live so called “under debt”.  
Every day the market of goods and services proliferates with various goods, commodities, 
however not all people can afford to have what market offers. In this situation lots of Russian 
citizens went to commercial banks to get money for desired furniture, electronic device, 
automobile or for just necessary money to have a good vacation abroad. However, after all the 
financial and economic crises that Russia crossed, clear majority of these people, due to decreased 
incomes, were financially unavailable to return the taken loans on time, hence finding themselves 
in “black” lists of the banks.  
Later, because of inferior credit histories, banks began to lend less and less money to these 
people, who afterward started to find alternative sources of financing. As most Russians do not 
possess extra money for peer lending, microcredit organizations (hereinafter MFOs) became more 
active, and microfinance market bloomed in Russia.  
Also, after Soviet Union breakdown, in a new economic realty the role of small and 
medium business became crucial for economic grow. However, while in western developed 
countries share of SME is 60-70% of GDP, in Russia it barely reaches to 15-20% level. Most of 
small entrepreneurs that start their business need financing from outside, but not having a collateral 
and credit history leave them out of bank-loaning. The only thing that all these people can do to 
accomplish their business ideas and survive the “death stage”, is to find other sources of financing. 
And, again microfinance organizations leave a hand to all these desperate people. 
Currently, microfinance organizations in Russia are of high importance, and regulation and 
supervision of these organizations is very hot topic. The industry is growing since 1990s and 
nowadays, perhaps nobody doubts about the important role of these organizations in financial 
market and in enhancement of financial inclusion in the country. However, the attitude of many 
citizens toward these organizations is not always positive, rather it is malevolent due to the 
unscrupulous lending practices, so called “usury” interest rates charged by some MFOs, high 
indebtedness of citizens, unscrupulous collection practices, etc.  
Until 2011 such organizations in Russia were not directly regulated, but rather were 
operating according to Civil Code of Russia and some other federal laws not straightly related to 
microfinance activities. The law “on Microfinance Activities and Microfinance Organizations” 
was issued in 2010, after which the activities of microfinance organizations standardized, and 
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Bank of Russia became the mega-regulator of the industry. A few years later, the law on “Self-
regulated organizations in financial market” came to existence, and all MFOs membered to self-
regulated organizations (hereinafter SROs).  
After the law on microfinance organizations imposed, year by year Bank of Russia imposes 
stricter and stricter limitations and normative acts on these organizations, which put the latter’s 
sustainable growth under risk. There is a non-official opinion circulated in various levels of 
regulatory bodies, that SROs and MFOs were not able to effectively self-regulate and self-organize 
the industry, and that Bank of Russia had to take the rule and regulate the industry.  
So, there is a real problem for further research to understand: (1) what are the current 
ethical issues of the industry that bring to “strict” state regulation, and (2) if SROs and MFOs 
aren’t able to manage with self-regulation, to figure out whether there are more effective 
approaches to self-regulation of the industry or not.  
Therefore, the goal of the current research is to explore the possibility of developing 
approaches to self-regulation of microfinance organizations. 
To achieve this goal, we have set the following objectives: 
• to study theoretical background of self-regulation 
• to determine a range of potential unethical behavior of MFOs that need regulation 
• to study main international trends of regulation and self-regulation in microfinance 
industry  
• to reveal the main ethical issues of Russian microfinance industry that might need 
regulation 
• to evaluate the approaches to self-regulation of Russian microfinance industry. 
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Chapter 1. Regulation of Moral Issues in Microfinance Industry: 
Theoretical Framework  
In this chapter we are going to build the theoretical framework for explanation of regulation 
in microfinance industry. In section 1.1 we will discuss the general theory of ethical behavior in 
the market economy and the limits of markets in removing unethical behavior. While doing this 
we will step by step apply this theory to microfinance sector will end up with potential situations 
of unethical behavior in this area. In section 1.2 we will provide a literature survey of other 
scholars’ opinions on these issues and will check our framework for consistency. In section 1.3 
we will review existing approaches to regulation and self-regulation of ethical behavior in the 
market. Finally, in section 1.4 we will review the main types of regulation in microfinance 
industry.   
 
1.1. Moral issues in microfinance sector  
 
Many economists believe that in perfectly competitive market moral judgements are not 
necessary. The rationale behind this thesis is that perfectly competitive markets remove all issues 
about efficiency and morality. The efficiency of markets terminates in the accomplishment of 
optimality, a point in which conflicting interests are pleasingly reconciled by the invisible hand 
(Andreicut  2010). Going back to Adam Smith, economics approves the view that each participant 
gains maximum while pursuing his individual self-interest to market activity (Sutherlanad 1998). 
In the scope of free market economics, morality appears to be unessential. 
In his work of “Morals by Agreement” (1986), David Gauthier also develops the idea that 
free market activity, in the absence of market failures, brings about optimal outcomes for the 
participating individuals. He continues to contend that a perfectly competitive market is a morally 
free zone. 
Generally, Gauthier’s thesis tries to derive morality from rationality. He believes that an 
individual is acting rationally if and only if she pursues “her greatest interest or benefit” (Guathier 
1987, page 135). Also, an individual does this by maximizing her utility in line with her 
preferences. 
As a basis for his thesis, Guathier uses the notion of Pareto optimality. Storchevoy (2015) 
also takes the First Theorem of Welfare Economics to prove that perfect competition eliminates 
moral and efficiency issues. He states that under perfect competition, allocation of resources is 
Pareto-efficient, which means that it is impossible to increase the total product by reallocation of 
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any resource. In other words, at Pareto efficiency the only way to make someone better off involves 
making someone else worse off.  
Finally, Storchevoy states that this thesis might be also justified by the fact that under 
perfect competition, everyone received the same output for the same type of input, since movement 
of resources will exclude unfair compensation very quickly. 
To understand whether perfect competitive market is ethical and what is moral issue, we 
will adhere again to the concept of Storchevoy (2015). He defines moral issues as a situation of 
choice which increases the well-being of one person and decreases the well-being of others. Going 
further, the author explains why not all actions might be considered as moral issues. First, if an 
action affects only one actor it is not a moral issue, since all moral issues are about social 
interaction of people. Also, if an action brings to pareto-optimality increasing well-being of all 
parties or vice versa, it cannot be a moral issue. As in business this kind of pure win-win is 
happened very rarely, Storchevoy generalizes that moral issues are formally a win–lose situation.  
Then, the author defines main characteristics of perfect competition, which are: (1) many 
small buyers and sellers; (2) perfect mobility of all people, products, and resources; (3) perfect 
divisibility of all products and resources; (4) all people have equal capabilities; (5) all people are 
neutral to each other; and (6) all people are fully rational and not bound by any cultural or social 
norms.  
Competitive markets may be understood as completely ethical if all people have the same 
opportunities. However, there are vulnerabilities such as market power, asymmetry of information 
personal differences, and non-neutrality that make difficult to analyze every type of moral issue 
(Storchevoy 2015). In microfinance market some of these vulnerability factors may be extremely 
strong, while the others may be very weak. 
Market power exists when one of the first three characteristics is not valid. For example, 
there are few buyers and sellers, mobility is not perfect, or imperfect divisibility of products. In 
microfinance, market power may be rather small if there is a strong competition between MFOs. 
If there is large number of firms the competition may be very effective.  
One demonstration of this vulnerability in microfinance market is that in many cases 
people urgently need money and accept the first option, because they cannot wait and search for a 
better option. As we know, especially in developing countries target group for microfinance 
services mainly consists of low income individuals, who face various difficulties in their everyday 
life. These people, due to different circumstances, very often admit the first offer and stay out of 
choice. Similarly, in many rural regions, where the financial inclusion is very low, people have 
very limited opportunities to choose among different providers of financial services due to luck of 
represented financial institutions.  
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Also, we can we explain the existence of market power in microfinance market with tie-in 
pricing technique. Although interest rates offered for microloans are quite higher than that’s of 
standard banks, however, lots of people are willing to take these loans since in short period of time 
high interest rates are not so tangible for them. But microfinance organizations very often impose 
on people other mandatory expenses such as loan insurance, high fines for arrears, extra fees for 
loan restructuring and prolongations, and other paid options as well. This kind of tying, especially 
by contract, very often is regarded as anti-competitive practice, since customers are harmed by 
being forced to purchase a good that they don’t want to buy actually.1  
Finally, we can also identify market power in microfinance as a hold-up situation. This 
happens when clients sign contracts after which it is impossible to change. This issue is very 
specific to microfinance market, as very often MFIs are accused not revealing the whole 
information on loan conditions to clients. Instead they attract customers, who sign contracts 
without paying attention to the details and later they find themselves locked within these contracts. 
This practice of “polite fraudulent” is used by many MFIs, the fact that pushes regulators to issue 
different legislations trying to force MFIs to depict the main conditions regarding the amount of 
loan, interest rates, terms, fines and penalties on more notable ways in loan contracts (on first 
pages, with large fonts).  
Asymmetric information, also known as information failure, happens when one 
party possesses greater material knowledge than the other party. For instance, when the seller of a 
good or service has greater knowledge than the buyer, even though vice versa is also possible. 
Almost all economic transactions involve information asymmetries.2  
In certain situations, asymmetric information may lead to adverse selection or moral risk. 
These are situations where individual economic decisions are theoretically worse than they would 
have been had all parties possessed more symmetrical information.  
Asymmetry of information in microfinance market might be very strong and two-sided. 
From one side, the borrowers might demonstrate unethical behavior by taking money from 
microfinance institutions well knowing that there will be low chances to return loans. Even worse, 
some swindlers-borrowers knowing well the loopholes of civil code and legislation, after first the 
payment stop to repay the loan and disappear as a rule. Finally, there are ones that exposing 
themselves as a conscientious and solvent citizen, take money and disappear from MFIs’ field of 
vision. This is taken place, as a rule, due to the adverse selection and not efficient assessment 
process of lenders.  
                                                 
1 Resource available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tying_(commerce) 
2 Resource available at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asymmetricinformation.asp 
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From the other side, sometimes microlenders are also engaged in unethical behavior while 
hiding some information about terms of the contract. In most cases MFOs do not disclose the 
essential characteristics of the proposed product (such as penalties, repayment scheme, possibility 
of extension or early repayment, etc.). This information is either provided in the general terms and 
conditions (conditions) of the loan (this document is usually posted on the company's website on 
pages of the third or more level, which makes it very difficult for the borrower to find it) or is 
absent altogether. The website also does not contain the text of a standard agreement with a 
microfinance organization – a borrower can familiarize himself with it only in the office and only 
at the stage of signing the contract.  
Different capabilities can also distort the balance between market actors leading to bad 
outcomes. In high competitive market, some people due to their smartness, agility could benefit 
more than people with limited capabilities. When this differentiation is high, slightly different 
capabilities not only modify moral issues but also tastes and correspondingly demand for goods 
and services as well. 
In microfinance market, difference in capabilities of actors are very common, especially 
from customer side. As a rule, vast majority of borrowers of microloans are financially illiterate 
and lack technical knowledge. This is the perfect inability to plan savings and investing for the 
future, inability to make financial decisions in simple life situations and as a result - assuming 
unjustified risks. 
Borrowers of microcredits also lack of will or rationality to avoid from temptations. Thanks 
to the active publicity and advertisement, the public has formed the idea of credit as a solution to 
all problems and at the same time there is no natural understanding for financially literate people 
that loans are financial service for not everyone (Solodukhina 2015, p.142). If a person cannot 
afford a loan, then he does not need such a loan or any kind of loan. 
Also, many borrowers are not able to plan their future. In the absence of proper self-control 
or negative experience, a person is involved in loan trap taking new ones to repay old ones.  
So, different capabilities lead not only to a decrease in the efficiency of the household 
economy, but also to a general decline in competition in the financial sector, as the provider of 
financial products and services does not need to take any measures to increase the competitiveness 
of its own products. 
Non-neutrality or discrimination in the market means that some actors might have 
different sympathies and attitudes toward others. This kind of mutual discrimination might distort 
perfect competition in the market and requires reassessment of moral norms (Storchevoy 2015, 
p.140).  
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Regardless, it is theoretically possible to have some kind of discriminative interaction 
between service providers and borrowers in microfinance, however, we will not take this 
externality into our analysis due to its negligible actuality in microfinance. Indeed, in some cases, 
managers or agents of some MFOs could enter in some discriminative lending practices, but this 
kind of practices are very rare among fair players and not specific to the industry in general.   
Therefore, we may expect the next moral issues in the relationships between microfinance 
institution(MFI) and its clients: 
• market power abuse in case of  
• small number of MFIs relatively to demand 
• poor awareness of customers about available MFIs  
• tie-in and hold-up effects 
• asymmetry of information about the terms of the contract (small fonts, complicated 
language, customer unwillingness to examine the contract, etc.) 
• non-caring about the customers who cannot make their own rational choice about 
borrowing money because they have lack of financial skills or weak will.  
 
1.2. Extant research of ethics in microfinance 
 
In this section we will try to check how the existing literature conceptualize the moral 
issues in microfinance institutions and will compare these views with the framework suggested in 
section 1.1.  
While some sceptics jokingly refute that there is no any ethics in finance and microfinance 
in particular3, however, a rational thought reveals that finance would be impossible without ethics 
and morality. The fact that we all place our assets in the hands of other people and are in 
relationship with financial institutions, requires enormous trust between us and these institutions. 
To support the mutual trust, both customers and microfinance institutions should follow the rules 
of ethics, anchor to more responsible business practices and exclude the possibility for some 
people to gain at other’s expense.  
Individuals in positions of management must make the decision every day whether or not 
to act in an ethical manner. Deciding what is considered right or wrong ethically, is not always 
black and white. Many times, managers find themselves pushing the limits and entering the grey 
area of ethics. De Cremer and de Bettignies (2013) explain that in the business environment there 
                                                 
3 This view expressed especially in a thin volume, The Complete Book of Wall Street Ethics, which claims to 
fill “an empty space on financial bookshelves where a consideration of ethics should be.” 
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are many implicit expectations and norms that motivate managers and ultimately may push them 
to cross the boundaries and behave unethically. Very often, competitiveness and greed could push 
managers into the ethical grey area. 
 According to De Cremer and de Bettingnies (2013), “This attitude of pushing the limits 
effectively clouds our own moral limits and, as a result, increases the chances that we eventually 
will cross the boundaries” (p. 65). Many managers believe if they are not doing anything illegal, 
they are acting ethically. This is not always the case; therefore, it is important for managers to 
understand the difference between laws and ethical standards. Once managers have a fair 
understanding of what is considered appropriate ethical behavior, they can focus on making good 
ethical decisions for the organization. 
 Regarding the relationship between laws and ethical standards, Keller-Krawczyk (2010) 
explains that laws are rules of conduct set by a governing body that either requires or prohibits 
individuals or businesses from performing certain actions. Failure to comply with the set laws may 
result in punishments such as financial penalties and/or imprisonment. As mentioned previously, 
it is not uncommon for individuals to believe that if they are operating within the boundaries of 
the law, then they are behaving ethically. Unfortunately, there are many actions that may be 
considered legal, but are not considered ethical. Keller-Krawczyk support this notion stating that 
usury (charging high interest rates in countries that do not set a legal limit on rates) is a good 
example of a behavior that is legal but also considered unethical. Business managers must attempt 
to understand the relationship and differences between laws and ethics if they wish to help 
implement ethics within their organization. 
 Managers are often aware of the laws and regulations because they are formally written 
and failure to comply with them will result in some sort of sanctioned punishment, whereas ethical 
standards are socially construed and failure to comply with these standards is not always 
punishable under state or federal sanctions. Cameron (2011) explains that ethical standards do not 
always serve as adequate fixed points for managers because they “often change over time and 
circumstance” thus they “frequently to do not remain stable because they are socially construed”.  
 Although laws and regulations are different than ethical standards, managers need to 
understand how the two can be integrated and used within their organization to help build a solid 
ethical foundation. Blodgett (2012) acknowledges that many philosophers and legal scholars have 
attempted to explain the complicated relationship that exists between laws and ethics and although 
it is still not easily understood, it is evident that there is indeed a connection between the two. A 
study conducted by Blodgett (2012) explored the idea of “substantive ethics” (an integration of 
law and ethics) and how it could be applied to corporate governance as well as the managerial 
decision-making process. 
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Basically, microfinance institutions are very often characterized as having dual mission: 
from one side to do good (increase the social outreach of credit) and to do well (achieve financial 
sustainability) (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
In recent years, however, more and more critics is directed to the microfinance industry, 
and undeniably many scholars nowadays emphasize that there is really “ethical crisis” in the field 
(Hudon and Sandberg, 2013). The debates on the topic of ethical crisis in microfinance started 
actively after 2007, when one of Mexican MFIs, which started its business from lending to poor 
people, went open in stock market offering its first IPO (Lewis, 2008). After, other MFIs have 
been accused in exploitative lending practices, unlawful and unethical loan collection tools, 
“forcing” borrowers into indebtedness, etc. 
In addition, the delinquency crises in its turn also darkened the impact of microfinance on 
clients and, alongside, the academic dispute provided evidence supporting the lack of impact of 
the microcredit programs on poverty reduction flourished (Banerjee et al, 2015). Thereafter, the 
wave of distrust toward microfinance and organizations engaged in microlending, ascended in 
different countries simultaneously.   
Going through the theory we can state that different authors tried to define the 
interdependencies and the relations taking place between ethics and microfinance. 
Vanroose (2007) distinguishes three paths along which ethics integrated into economics: 
1. the first path refers to the situation in which economists, by following their own 
ethical values, influence the way of practicing economics, 
2. the second path is based on the assumption that ethical values adopted and accepted 
by economic entities, help them by influencing their behavior, 
3. the third path indicates that economic institutions and economic policy represent 
factors exerting diverse impacts on people and thus ethical judgments and opinions presented 
along with economic standpoints and assessments are so important. The author then generalized 
that the above outlined multidimensional relationships between ethics and economics also can be 
used to explain the connections between ethics and microfinance. 
At this point, as Adamek (2014) noted, microfinance can be observed as the manifestation 
of a specific economic activity formula which by assumption, alongside offering specialized 
financial products with non-finance services both to the poor and micro-entrepreneurs, allows 
implementation of such goals as simplifying and spreading access to financial resources, 
promoting entrepreneurship and, in consequence, creating the background for collecting and 
multiplying additional savings, hereafter ultimately establishing a sense of economic safety and 
stabilization.  
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Then Vanroose, banking on the already presented paths along which ethics enters 
economics, formulated the possibility to identify three areas of ethics and microfinance 
interpenetration in this way: (1) the influence of ethical values to the broadly understood 
microfinance, their institutions, products and environment, (2) the impact of accepted ethical 
values, observed as the framework influencing the model for performing microfinance activities 
along with the operational nature of their products, (3) the effect of ethical values, accepted by 
stakeholders, on the process of evaluating the basics, methods and results of microfinance 
activities referred to as the element of economic, socio-welfare policy at micro and macro scale. 
However, we should notice, that the aforementioned areas of ethics and microfinance 
interpenetration sometimes overlap and, at the same time, create space where occurring ethical 
dilemmas (related to the theory-practice integration) find their definitions.  
Regarding this M. Hudon and J. Sandberg (2013, p. 562) indicate three vital ethical issues 
related to microfinance. They stance questions referring to whether a) microfinance activities are 
justified, b) how they should function (whether microfinance institutions exploit poor clients) and 
c) who should perform microfinance activities? 
Regarding the first question, whether microlending is justified, we should consider the 
economic (cost coverage) and social (outreach) dimensions of microfinance activities. 
Microfinance has an economic dimension and, it is rational that it be required to show 
efficiency in its management in form of costs-earning a profit. However, it is also a tool for social 
policies and some “welfarists” argue that it should subordinate its strategies and policies to its 
social function, which means to offer the best possible service at a price that is affordable by the 
greatest number of people (particularly poor) although it might mean to stay dependent on 
donations and subsidies (Argandona 2009).  
From the other side, some “institutionalists”, while admitting the importance of the social 
function of MFI, argue that financial self-sufficiency is a necessary condition for the MFI to 
survive and broaden their activities reaching to more clients, as its social function requires. 
Moreover, these authors believe that both goals should go alongside at least in the medium term.  
Hence, these contradicting positions rose a loud debate among scholars, who tried to find 
common opinions toward the two dimensions of microfinance institutions. A main part this debate 
between institutionalists and welfarists is related to very high interest rates charged by the MFIs.  
According to Argandona (2009), there are three economic and ethical issues that should be 
answered regarding the argument of extra high interest rates: 1) whether these high rates are 
justified 2) What should be the interest rate stipulated for each operation? 3) If, as seems logical, 
a high interest rate discourages the poorest clients, does this give rise to a moral duty for the MFI? 
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Recent research approves that interest rates on microloans are consistently much higher 
than those offered by standard commercial banks, even in developing countries (Hudon M, 
Sandberg J., 2013). From the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database we can see that 
typical annual rates range between 20 and 70 percent, with an overall average of about 30-35 
percent.4 However, these figures do not give any justified answer to whether such interest rates are 
exploitative or not. Hudon and Sandberg believe that several important issues should be discussed 
thoroughly before answering 70% interest rate charged by microfinance institutions (hereinafter 
MFIs) is ethical or not. The authors go further stating that first issue is to understand how clients 
will be affected by high interest rates.  
The next important issue within this context is what are the drivers behind comparatively 
high interest rates on microloans. To put it differently, it is only stockholders’ high expectation 
from their investments or there are other factor laying behind high interest rates. Here, according 
to Hudon & Ashta (2013), the fairness of an overall microcredit depends on where the money 
goes, or whether a substantial portion of the interest yield was extracted from MEIs and transfer 
as dividends to shareholders.  
About high interest rates, as well as, other issues common in microfinance industry more 
comprehensive and specific evaluations are given in the reports of CGAP (the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor). CGAP is a global partnership of more than 30 organizations such as The World 
Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), Citi Foundation, European Investment Bank (EIB), 
European Commission, Inter-American Development Bank, International Finance Corporation, 
KfW Bankengruppehat, ministries of different countries and other financial organizations. As 
CGAP stated “it develops innovative solutions through practical research and active engagement 
with financial service providers, policy makers, and funders to enable approaches at scale”.5 So, 
the regular reports and guidelines by CGAP are highly valued by the researchers, practitioners, 
government officials, financial market representatives and etc.     
GCAP report (2012) suggests that almost 80 percent of a typical MFI’s income covers two 
types of costs: operating expenses and the cost of funds. From one hand, the operational costs are 
unusually high due to that fact that MFIs typically administer vast number of microloans, which 
generally requires face-to-face interaction with borrowers. From the other hand, the cost of funds 
is usually very high because MFIs seldom founded by its clients, instead take investment from 
commercial high price sources.  
                                                 
4 Source from Rosemberg 2013 
5 http://www.cgap.org/about 
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Hence, Hudon and Sandberg (2013) explain that even if an average MFI will cut out all its 
profits, it could only reduce the interest rate by roughly one-seventh, which again proved the notion 
that interest rates for microloans are not due to desire earn higher profits, but rather to cover high 
operational costs.  
Another major issue related to abuses of high interest rates charged by MFI, is the consent 
of clients. Interestingly, in many countries states, under pressure of politician, usually force MFIs 
to reduce so called “exploitative interest rates” (Hubka and Zaidi 2005), even though these interest 
rates are justified both ethically and economically. Moreover, very often clients are willing to pay 
these high rates. Remarkably, many supporters of microfinance reply to the criticism of 
exploitative interest rates with an argument that appeals precisely to clients' accord. Here, again, 
various authors have different point of view not only on the act of consent by clients, but rather 
analyzing the process of consent of high interest rates by clients in theoretical and practical 
dimensions.  
As an example, Sandberg states in his article from 2012, that “researchers need more solid 
empirical evidence on the impact of various microfinance initiatives before accepting them”. 
Amold and Valentin's (2013) supplemented this idea concluding that “ultimately must depend on 
whether businesses enhance or undermine the capabilities of the poor”.  
Hodon and Sandberg, summarizing their analysis, agreed that generally high rates are 
justified and added that if some clients cannot afford cost-covering interest rates, it is not the fault 
MFI but that’s of public bodies who should issue subsidies to help MFIs decrease their prices or 
to help these citizens in other ways. 
Summarizing our review on recent criticisms of exploitative high interest rates charged by 
MFIs, we should confirm, that majority of the scholars agree that a more deeper investigation is 
needed to be able to generalize the statement of “exploitative microlending”.  Authors such as 
Sandberg, Adamek, Wong, Richards, etc., stick to the position that it is not wise to generalize and 
attribute existing ethical problems to the whole microfinance sector. Moreover, majority of 
researchers agree that few cases of exploitative microlending practices cannot compromise the 
whole industry and hide the objective reasons of high interest rates due to high operational and 
funding costs combined with clients' assumed level of tolerance. Therefore, in our analysis of 
Russian microfinance market we will need to pay special attention to distinguishing objective 
reasons of high interest rates and objective proof of exploitative practices.  
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1.3. Theoretical approaches to self-regulation of market participants 
 
Starting to review of literature on self-regulation of market, we should agree with Petrov’s 
idea (2013) that when determining the boundaries of self-regulation, one should take into account 
that state regulation of economy can be realized in several ways: (1) direct government regulation; 
(2) by quasi-regulation; (3) self-regulation; (4) joint regulation (so-called co-regulation).   
Now we need to explore the literature on possibilities of regulation and self-regulation of 
ethical behavior in a market. The main research questions of this literature review are to understand 
if participants of the market can realize the benefits of self-regulation, then reach to an agreement 
about realistic organizational mechanism and implement this self-regulation in the market.  
The very term "self-regulation" has, at a minimum, a sociological, economic and legal 
content. From the point of view of sociology, self-regulation is an element of civil society capable 
of balancing effectively system of social processes, actively developing only in conditions state 
support of the mechanisms of civil society (Bodyakin 2008). From the point of view of economic 
science, self-regulation is collective regulation of markets and spheres by economic agents, 
without state interference, and in the legal science its content is also determined uniformly and 
depends on the industry of legal regulation. 
Self-regulation is a set of institutions in which standards and rules of conduct are set by an 
industry-level organization, rather than at the governmental or firm level (Gunningham and Rees, 
1997), The goal of these institutions is to progress mechanisms that form or oblige organizational 
behavior in order to provide a signal of organizational quality to key stakeholders (Darnall and 
Carmin, 2005). Self-regulatory regimes might be both private without any state authority and 
public-private delegated authority to non-state actors. Therefore, self-regulatory regimes can 
operate either as a substitute for or a complement to government regulation. 
Williams (2004) in his paper discusses the potential of industry self-regulation and 
concluded that it might be a panacea. On one hand, as noted the author, self-regulatory regimes 
offer some important advantages over more traditional regulation models that could be harnessed 
to create a more responsive regulatory system. On the other hand, there are several examples of 
failed attempts at self-regulation and certainly some inherent weaknesses in a great many others 
that have succeeded. Based on Williams paper, we can state that the emergence of self-regulatory 
systems is a rational, self-interested response to external pressures in marketplace and the broader 
societies in which firms operate. And free-riding problem is still a big issue in the industries that 
go through the path of self-regulation.  
To explore concept of industry self-regulation we will stick to William’s paper on the 
economic theory of self-regulation. The author uses some standard economic theories and models 
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to explain the concept of self-regulation. One model that is very relevant to self-regulation of 
microfinance industry and can help us to grasp this concept, is principal-agent problem framework.  
In his paper, Williams states that when a group of firms decide to establish a self-regulatory 
regime they enter into an intrinsic contract. And each participant is committed to observe and 
follow the rules of the association. The main problem with this kind of contact is the fact that the 
principal (in this case, the self-regulatory association) may not possess perfect information about 
agents (the industry participants) voluntarily joining the self-regulatory regime, which give rise to 
the problem of adverse selection (Williams 2004, page 18).  
Definitely, some of the firms joining the association to secure the insurance and signing 
about benefits of membership, but lack actual intention of following through with the 
commitments. After an agent has joined, the principal might lack perfect information whether the 
agent is following its contractual duties or not. This situation might bring to moral hazards. In 
addition, there might be occasions for firms that they will feel pressure to avoid, therefore will 
choose not to report about it to the principal. Williams believes that all these information 
asymmetries and conflicts of interest become highly important in determining the success of a self-
regulatory regime. 
Hence, the importance of institutional remedies rises to cope with these issues of non-
compliances in principal-agent relationship in order to have effective self-regulation. As Elinor 
Ostrom argues “all efforts to organize collective action … by a set of principals who wish to gain 
collective benefits, must address a common set of problems. These have to do with coping with 
free-riding, solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and 
monitoring individual compliance with rules. (Ostrom 1990, page 27). 
Therefore, any successful self-regulatory system, Williams concludes, probably requires 
an institutional setting to augment group interaction directed to keeping and strengthening of 
trustworthy commitments in the following ways: 
- through regular meetings of industry participants to share with best practices, 
- hiring an independent auditor that can collect, analyze, and distribute information, 
- establishing an appropriate and enforceable set of sanctions to punish free-riders 
and idlers when necessary. 
Possibly the most problematic of these three elements are the sanctions, since self-
regulation is taken place in voluntary basis, and any pure form rules out legal recourse and external 
enforcement. 
The economic theory of self-regulation in Williams’ paper was merely a starting point back 
in 2004, and for a much deeper research, pros and cons of industry self-regulation should be 
evaluated to be able to make more precise judgements. Additionally, more thorough understanding 
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of the institutional provisions is needed that support cooperation and compliance with rules will 
lead for the adoption of self-organizing systems in various industries. 
Regarding the effectiveness of self-regulation of non-governmental organizations 
(hereinafter NGOs), an excellent paper came to existence in 2008 by Gugerty M.K. The author, 
using cross-national data on 20 African countries, shows that there are three major types of self-
regulation: national-level guilds, NGO-led clubs and voluntary codes of conduct. The research 
reveals that voluntary codes are the most common form of self-regulation but have the weakest 
regulatory strength. In her article, Gugerty uses concept of collective action to show the role that 
incentives and institutional design might play in overcoming free-riding and shirking problems. 
The main finding of this article is that there are two conditions for effective self-regulation of non-
governmental organizations: clear standards and enforcement mechanisms. 
It seems that the choice of a method for regulating some particular activities (in some cases, 
particular types of legal entities) is carried out by the legislator taking into account the significance 
of public relations, the risks inherent in the regulated activity, and other factors that may influence 
the choice of the method of implementation regulatory impact on a particular type of activity. 
 
1.4. Regulation and Self-Regulation in microfinance industry 
  
In this section, first we will review the two main types of MFIs’ regulation widely accepted 
both in theory and practice, then we will review the literature regarding self-regulation of 
microfinance segment. 
Regarding the first task, we will stick to the conceptual guidelines of MFIs regulation and 
supervision offered by CGAP. The latter is an independent policy and research center that is 
supported by over 30 development agencies and private foundations. Since CGAP develops and 
promotes standards to governments, microfinance providers, donors and investors, we will take 
CGAP’s guidelines as a basis for our review of current issues and aspects of microfinance 
regulation.  
For the second task we will review the existing literature related to self-regulation of MFIs. 
Focus will be held the more recent studies that directly and/or indirectly shed light on the topic of 
self-regulation in microfinance segment. 
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Regulation of microfinance institutions 
 
The financial sector is among the most regulated and supervised aspect of economy 
worldwide, regardless countries’ economic development or the nature of political system 
(Rosengard 2009). This is not accidental or coincidental, since services offered by financial 
institutions are unique and therefore carry also specific risks. In addition, microfinance institutions 
are under extra attention due the risks of their operations.  
Rosengard states that risks associated with these financial functions are twofold: 
macroeconomic market failures and microeconomic institutional collapses. According to him there 
are four macroeconomic market failures related to microfinance institutions: 1) microfinance 
services are quasi-public goods, necessary for efficient economy that should be available, 2) 
negative externalities, the difficulties of any single MFI has social impact for the society, 3) 
macroeconomic disequilibrium caused by the negative externalities, and 4) asymmetries of 
information, both from savers side that have lack of information to evaluate stability of depositary 
MFI, and from lenders side who have difficulties to assess the borrowers’ willingness to return the 
loans.  
Hence, all these vulnerabilities dictate the need for regulation of the industry in many 
countries. However, while the importance of the regulation in microfinance admitted by majority 
scholars, researchers and governmental representatives as well, the distinct types of such 
regulation is a very tough topic of discussion among the same people. 
In 2010, the generalized experience in regulating microfinance activities was reflected in 
the document of the Basel Committee on "Microfinance activities and the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision”, which contains 25 principles regulation of microfinance 
organizations (hereinafter - Basic principles). Some of these principles have development in 2016 
in the document " Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision to the regulation and supervision of institutions relevant to financial inclusion”. 
Basically, there are two main types of financial regulation in international practice: 
Prudential and Non-prudential.  
From one hand, prudential regulation guarantees the financial sustainability of the industry 
by providing proper legal basis for financial operations to avoid and decrease instability of the 
sector. A financial authority directly states requirements for MFIs and carries the responsibility of 
regulated institutions and market.  
From the other hand, non-prudential regulation covers regulations about the institution’s 
business activities and processes. A state does not impose financial institutions to follow distinct 
rules and requirements rather provides with guidelines and standards. These standards are mostly 
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related to the such topics as consumer protection, financial crimes exceptions, customer-oriented 
interest rate policies, fraud prevention, information discloser for clients, etc.   
 
        Figure 1: Oversight of microfinance institutions6 
 
Prudential regulation of MFIs - according to CGAP microfinance consensus guidelines, 
following set of prudential regulations are more relevant for microfinance institutions:7 
Minimum capital requirement (MCR). Generally, the setting of minimum capital that a 
deposit taker institution should provide to get license for microfinancing activities, is the first 
standard imposed by authorities. This barrier controls the flow of new players to the market. When, 
for example, MCR is too high, many MFIs can’t enter to the segment. If MCR is low, on the other 
hand, the market becomes more attractive and almost all MFIs that takes deposits from public 
could be eligible to enter the market.  
Capital adequacy requirement. This ratio refers to the minimum amount of capital a 
financial institution should hold to avoid solvency problems. According to the Basel 2 prudential 
standards, all licensed credit institutions are obliged to maintain their level of own funds to 
minimum 8 percent of their total risk weighted assets.8 
Liquidity and Foreign Exchange Risks. These are two other areas where the need of more 
conservative prudential regulation for MFIs that take deposits, is high of course depending on the 
degree of exposure of MFIs to domestic and foreign markets (Pouchus A, 2012). The depository 
MFIs should be subject of more stricter liquidity requirements than conventional banks should.  
                                                 
6 Source from Rosengard 2009 
7 Key ideas in this section are drawn from CGAP (2003, 2012) 
8 Finding Basel 1 requirements obsolete and following some years of discussion and negotiation, member 
countries adopted the so-called ‘Basel 2’ approach in 2004, which is being implemented at different speeds in different 
countries: Europe requires all credit institutions (banks) to adhere from 2008; while other countries follow at their 
own pace. 
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Loan Documentation and Reporting. While the requirements for standard banks on loan 
documentations are mostly justified due to the size and nature of loans issued, from the other side, 
for MFIs the same requirements are almost irrational considering size of the loans and customers 
they have.  
Protection of Depositors. Many experts and non-professionals contend that if deposits in 
commercial banks are insured, deposits in other institutions such as MFIs should also be insured. 
However, countries and regulators should find balanced solutions not allowing deposit protection 
systems to damage microfinance institutions. 
Ownership requirements. Ordinary banking regulations impose clear requirements on who 
is permissible to become shareholder, minimum number of shareholders and maximum share of 
ownership for any shareholder. The rationale behind this requirement is to thwart an accumulation 
of ownership allowing single owner to have a right making key policy decisions in his/her own 
interest without having consent of others (Eshborne 2003).  
 
Non-prudential regulation of MFIs - includes wide range of issues, that mostly relate to 
the way of “conducting business” (CGAP 2003).9 The following issues are more relevant to 
microfinance institutions in different countries: 
Permission of lending. While in some countries any activity that is not prohibited is 
supposed to be allowable, and unlicensed entities have a right to lend as long as it is not prohibited 
legally, for the other countries, especially in formerly-socialist countries, a lending activity of an 
institution is not clear unless there is a legal regulation to conduct such a business. In third 
countries, however, only licensed and prudentially regulated institutions are permitted lending 
activities, regardless these entities take deposit or not.  
In both cases, when the legal frameworks are vague or completely prohibited for 
unlicensed entities, non-prudential regulation is of high importance. 
Consumer protection. There are several major customer-protection problems in 
microfinance concerning almost all countries: (1) abusive lending and collection practices, (2) 
truth in lending, (3) Over-indebtedness and (4) Interest rate caps. 
The first concern is about the protection of the customers from MFIs who loan money 
without complete and thorough analysis on borrowers’ repayment ability. In many countries, 
customers are subject for this kind of practices, and states should implement some regulation, 
usually non-prudential supervision. Also, as many micro-lenders believe that microlending is 
                                                 
9  CGAP uses such a comparison of non-prudential regulation and “conduct of business” in Microfinance 
Guidelines 2003 
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sustainable only with high repayment rates, however, this kind of approach might lead to tough 
collection practices having disastrous effect on borrowers and well-being of their families. Here, 
rules as coercion and pressure exclusion from MFIs practices are subject for state regulation.  
The second issue is about providing by MFIs transparent, accurate and complete 
information about terms and full cost of credits to clients. As already mentioned, fixed costs for 
MFIs to have the same amount of loan portfolio is much higher than having portfolio of few big 
loans. Due to this reason, MFIs usually charge high interest rate for their services. In addition, 
various combinations of transaction fees and numerous interest-calculation methods create real 
difficulties for the clients to make comparison of interest rates offered by lenders. 
For this purpose, many countries impose special requirement on MFIs to disclose their 
effective interest rates using the same formula stated by regulators. Even though some 
microlenders argue against such a requirement, however, discloser of full cost of loans to people 
is considered to be the major step toward ethical business and also can push microlenders to focus 
more on increasing their efficiency and reduce interest rates of offered microloans. 
After crisis of 2008-2009, the over-indebtedness became more relevant issue for regulatory 
bodies of many countries. Due to the absence of clear well-established credit reporting systems, 
the over-indebtedness of borrowers difficult to estimate and make appropriate evaluation and 
comparisons. Very often, people’s inability to repay taken loans is not immediately shown in 
lender’s repayment statistics, which means that under inadequate control, loan officers of MFIs 
could roll over unpayable loans. In addition, clients might pay the taken loans with new ones. 
Surely, only taking account all these issues, the balanced and proper regulation should be 
implemented. 
From consumer protection perspective, the set of interest rate caps is another issue for 
regulation. There is a common argument against regulatory caps that they could damage micro-
borrowers’ access to microfinance market. This is because of microlenders usually face high 
administrative costs. Moreover, micro-lend portfolios of MFIs are mostly homogenous and as a 
rule consist of numerous tiny loans. However, many people do not grasp the idea, that high interest 
rates mostly are mostly consequence of many objective reasons such as cost structure, structure of 
capital suppliers.  
Credit histories of borrowers. Credit reference services are another subject for non-
prudential regulation. Having credit bureaus might be helpful for both borrowers and lenders. The 
latter, collecting information on client’s credit records, can reduce risk of non-repayment and be 
more courageous in lending, while borrowers could benefit from the opportunity to get loans from 
different lenders.  
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Self-regulation of microfinance institutions 
 
Unfortunately, when it comes to the effectiveness of self-regulation in microfinance, the 
literature is very scarce. Only very few research papers tried to shed light on the issue of effective 
self-regulation of MFIs.  
One such paper that tries to answer whether regulated microfinance institutions achieve 
better sustainability and outreach, is by Hartarska and Nadolnyak from 2007. In their article, the 
authors explore the impact of regulation on MFI performance using data for 114 MFIs from 62 
countries with the help of empirical model. The analysis shows that regulatory involvement does 
not directly influence performance either in terms of operational self-sustainability or outreach. 
The article also finds that less leveraged MFIs have better sustainability, and that MFIs’ 
transformation into regulated financial institutions might not lead to improved financial results and 
outreach.  
Regarding to more recent studies, we have the paper of Dayson and Vik from 2013, which 
tries to evaluate the effectiveness of self-regulation in microfinance from Europe perspective. The 
paper analyses over 70 frameworks (guidelines, ratings and codes of practice). Dayson and Vik 
argue that there are three main factors determining the effectiveness of a self-regulation 
framework: (1) the absence of an effective mechanism to cope with non-compliance will make a 
framework weak in setting standards and lacking in credibility, as there are no penalties for those 
providers not obeying the standards; (2) if a framework includes standards not representing the 
interest of the whole segment, these standards must be extracted. This is because there is a risk 
that a code might become current practices for all providers not being determined by the interests 
of the sector as a whole; (3) absence of transparent, identical and publicly available performance 
measures which will allow providers make comparisons via peer learning and research on drivers 
of performance (Dayson and Vik, page 3).  
However, the authors conclude that only having framework of all these features does not 
guarantee the existence of excellent standards and practices of providers. A code of practice is 
useful if regulation of MFIs is inappropriate for some reasons (e.g. prudential regulation may not 
be appropriate for MFIs not taking deposits, or it is too extensive for small MFIs), if the need for 
regulation is modest, if there is limited political appetite to formally regulate MFIs and finally if 
MFIs are not effectively self-regulated. 
Perhaps, the most recent research paper on self-regulation of MFis is the series of two 
papers by Afonso, Morvant-Roux, Forcella and Guérin (2016, 2017). Both papers are directed to 
the investigation of insufficiencies of self-regulation in preventing over-indebtedness using the 
case of Dominican Republic based on a fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2015. The authors 
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conclude that self-regulation mechanisms fail to fully fulfil their goals in the Dominican market. 
They argue that although financial exclusion justifies the idea of an unlimited microcredit market, 
however the focus on growth requirements and high competition strongly jeopardize the positive 
outcomes of microcredit on clients’ well-being. They state that the two conditions for effective 
self-regulation (clear standards and enforcement mechanisms) mentioned by Gugerty (2008) are 
not met in Dominican Republic. 
Therefore, we may expect that an effective combination of regulation and self-regulation 
of the industry should be directed to the following actions.   
• increasing the level of price competition and reducing market power of individual 
MFIs to achieve a lower interest rate, 
• avoiding the practices of providing credits to people who objectively cannot serve 
the debt (to exclude the lock-in effect in debt funnel),  
• avoiding the practices of providing credits to people who subjectively cannot make 
responsible decisions (have weak will or limited rationality),  
• adherence to the principles of more responsible lending by MFIs (usage of more 
effective evaluation mechanisms to check creditworthiness of a potential borrower), 
• setting limits for overall indebtedness of a borrower, 
• assistance to increase financial literacy of the population. 
Research gap  
A review of the current literature regarding ethics, microfinance and regulation reveals that 
very few authors analyzed the ethical dimension of microfinance, and even few studied regulation 
and morality-based self-regulation of microfinance organizations.  
Both foreign and Russian literature on the topic of self-regulation in microfinance market 
is very limited, and we can state that research done only scarcely relate to the problem of effective 
self-regulation.  
Number of scholars were trying to illustrate MFOs’ role in economy, the issues related to 
MFOs’ activities, challenges of regulation and supervision of the industry. There are also authors 
writing on various topics related to MFIs, but most of these works carry descriptive character and 
do not give insights to major ethical problems of the industry that generate the necessity of state 
regulation. 
Therefore, there is a gap regarding research in the field of effective approaches to self-
regulation of microfinance industry, as well as studies analyzing how SROs could effectively 
prevent MFOs from unethical and unscrupulous practices.  
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Chapter 2. Regulation of microfinance institutions in other countries: 
historical overview 
In this chapter we will review of international experience of regulation and self-regulation 
in different countries to see if our theoretical framework works and what is the practical solutions. 
In section 2.1 we will discuss briefly the main models of microfinance organizations’ development 
accepted by majority scholars.  In section 2.2 we will discuss the experience of United States n 
microfinance industry regulation. In section 2.3 we will first describe the history of microfinancing 
in Europe and then discuss several countries’ experience of MFIs regulation (France, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Poland, Hungary). In section 2.4 we will describe the experience of Southeast 
Asia and counties which comprise a very different picture of microfinancing (Bangladesh and 
India).  
Before turning to the review of MFIs regulation and self-regulation experience in other 
countries, it would be better to set several questions that will navigate us through this journey. 
Thus, in this chapter we should try to find answers to such question as: (1) which of the issues 
discussed in the first chapter are really regulated in various countries? (2) what are the combination 
of regulation and self-regulation in various countries and what factors determine it? (3) when and 
how self-regulation failed or succeeded in different countries? (4) whether can we say that state 
regulation is always effective or ineffective?  
 
2.1. Main models of microfinance institutions’ development 
 
Generally, there are three major models of modern microfinance institutions’ development 
in the World practice that are widely used among majority scholars: American, German and 
Mixed. As a basis for such division is considered the motivation and the functionality character of 
financial institutions. 
1. American model is oriented mostly to the development of small business, which is 
implemented directly by the State. In particular, this function is the duty of US Small Business 
Administration (SBA) - an independent federal government agency, established under the Small 
Business Act in 1953. The agency was created for the lobby of his interests at the state level and 
has a substantial number of branches across the country.  
2. The German model, having the same functionality of supporting small 
entrepreneurs, is based on the interaction of the state bank with private financial institutions. At 
the same time, the functions of the distributor of federal money are on the KFW Development 
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Bank. However, the microfinance activities are carried out at the expense of private financial 
organizations, which lend to entrepreneurs. 
3. The representatives of Mixed model are such underdeveloped countries as 
Bangladesh, Brazil, etc. In this case, the motivation behind microfinancing is mostly directed to 
the decrease of poverty. This model is also considered to a be the classical model of 
microfinancing, as it comes from Grameen Bank’s experience.  
 
2.2. Regulation of microfinance institutions in United States  
 
The roots of microfinance in United States go back to the late 19th century, when so called 
“salary lenders” emerged.10 It was a period, when low interest rates for loans were hampered 
legally, and microlending was not profitable. In this situation, in place of legal lenders, illegal 
small lenders started to offer loans to people openly, considering that their actions are legitimate. 
The main problem of this kind of illegal lending was the absence of legal basis for lenders that 
they could use to enforce repayments of loans by borrowers. This circumstance made these lenders 
to adopt other alternative ways of to ensure the repayment of given loans such as using the bad 
image of defaulters among majority employers. The latter prefer to fire and not hire people who 
were under debts. This technique was effectively used by money lenders also called “loan sharks”.  
Small loans offered by these lenders were given with high interest rates justifying it with 
the high costs of tracking and pursuing potential defaulters. The attitude of lenders toward 
defaulters were also varying. While some lenders were more benevolent and tried to offer options 
helping borrowers to get out of debt funnel, the others demonstrated unscrupulous practices of 
collection.  
The role of borrowers’ supporters took social elites such as businessmen and charity 
organizations, who provided borrowers the opportunity to protect their rights. With the help of 
these charity associations, later the draft of Uniform Small Loan Law was ratified, which was 
continued to other states beginning from 1917. After this law was enacted, consumer protection 
mandated and interest rate caps were set in size of 3.5% a day (42% a year).11   
The next period of illegal microlending started in 1920s, when so called violent loan sharks 
came to existence which were also accused for their ties with mafia and criminal. These new types 
of lenders claimed that they were not engaged in microlending activities rater buying rights of 
                                                 
10 Resource available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loan_shark   
11 Ibid 
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salaries. Although decreasing steadily, American loansharking continues to exist even today, when 
legal payday lending is surging in all states.   
The new era of microfinance in United States started from 1970s, when necessity of 
inclusive financial system for people, who stayed aside from financial products and services, 
became broadly obvious in the country.  
The development of microfinance market was accompanied with the recognition, 
establishment and development of small business. As the importance of small business was 
growing dramatically Small Business Administration (hereinafter SBA), a federal government 
agency was tasked to clarify and define the small business and its owners in formal way (Pierce, 
2013). For this purpose, SBA in 1991 created new type of business calling it microenterprises, 
entities, that have five or fewer employees including owners.  
With the growth of small business, the importance of microfinance also grew in the 
country. In 1973, StoreBank Corporation was founded in Chicago’s south side where small 
enterprises were lacking financial resources (Timeline 1973-2011). Also, Woman’s Economic 
Development in Bozeman, Montana was formed to help female entrepreneurs to get access to 
financial system. Basically, these two organizations highlighted the importance of small 
businesses who are in vulnerable zone and do deserve benevolent conditions for financial 
inclusion.  
Since 1977, several laws and legislative acts came to existence to support access of 
microenterprises to microfinance market. The major one was the “Community Reinvestment Act” 
of 1977 (CRA), with which Congress requires financial institutions to implement their duty of 
serving the community with credits and deposits. Likewise, CRA encouraged banks to invest in 
MFIs offering low-income population safe and transparent services. Going forward with this 
course, CRA empowers regulators to base ranking system of banks on their participation in such 
activities. However, this act was criticized later for its lacking directives for encouragement and 
basis for determination of appropriate institutions to meet community’s credit needs (Leminh 
2015).  
Self-Help Credit Union was created in North Carolina as a model for microfinance 
institutions for Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) in 1980 (Leminh 2015). 
These institutions served the low-income individuals with broad microfinance products. Later 
Self-Help grew to national level. In 1990s the industry rush and several regulations came to 
existence. In 1991 ACCION International12 bring its model of microlending to USA (Timeline 
                                                 
12 ACCION is a community development organization that was founded in 1961 with the aim of enabling people 
living in poverty to assist themselves through their own skills and talents.   
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1973-2011). The organization piloted the first microlending program in Brooklyn, New York, that 
targeted small-scale, informal economy entrepreneurs. Starting from New York City, the ACCION 
U.S. network very soon became the biggest microlending network in the country already in 2006 
with its five members.13 
So far microfinancing in the United States stopped to be just small activities with 
insignificant amounts, but rather well-developed industry. In 2010, almost 347,000 people 
benefited from Pay Day Loans totaling $164 million. 14  The same year took place the first 
Microfinance USA nationwide conference gathering practitioners, policymakers, investors and 
enthusiasts to engage, explore, and expand the domestic microfinance field (Timline US). 
Presently, the main MFIs in the United States implement microfinance activities in one of 
three forms: (1) non-profit organizations that act as distributors of federal money, (2) non-profit 
organizations that operate independently from the government, and (3) for-profit organizations 
(Pierce). The role of SBA is to distribute federal money to non-profit lenders, not to directly lend 
small businesses. Basically, SBA provides MFIs with guidelines for loans, and MFIs as third-party 
are distributing government’s money through various SBA programs.   
The biggest MFI in United States is ACCION USA, which distributes most of SBA funds. 
Up to now ACCION issued loans worth 305 million since its founding. The average loan from 
ACCION is $7000 with interest rates ranging 8,99% to 15,99%.15 
Customer protection related regulation. Basically, the formal statutory regime, 
overriding banks and other for-profit lenders, does not have effective frameworks for microfinance 
activities. This problem comes from the fact, that there is not clear categorizing of MFIs. And after 
the recent financial crisis, United States was forced to reevaluate its regulatory environment for 
microfinance activities. As a response to the financial crisis, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (DFWSRCP) was signed by president Obama on July 2010.16 This 
act reconsidered the past few decades’ trend of deregulation and stressed the necessity of at least 
some safety measures and precautions for microcredit regulation (Leminh 2015). 
Interest rates and abuses related regulation. Although less controversial than ones of 
customer protection, however microfinance in United States includes issues of high interest rates 
                                                 
13 The five members are ACCION Chicago, ACCION New Mexico-Arizona-Colorado, ACCION San-Diego, 
ACCION Texas-Louisiana and ACCION USA 
14 2011 US Microenterprise Census Fast Facts, FIELD AT THE ASPEN INST. (Feb. 2012), resource available 
at http://fieldus.org/publications/2011CensusFacts.pdf 
15 Figures are from 2013, need to be updated 
16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Ac
t 
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related to the payday lending regulation. As noted Leminh (2015) wage assignments were used to 
secure payday loans in the 1900s, which enabled the lender to collect payment from the borrower's 
employer. Currently, a typical situation in a payday loan is demonstrated in other ways: the 
consumer writes a $300 check payable in few weeks and receives back $255 in cash at the time he 
or she needs it. The remaining $45 the lender keeps as commission for its service. Lenders simply 
collected payments from the employers of borrowers. As already mentioned above, in 1916 
Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL) was drafted as a result of efforts by regulators, customer 
advocates and lenders (Leminh 2015). The law was issued to enable small-loan lending at “the 
lowest practicably profitable rates by licensed and transparent lenders” (Mann R.J., 2012). By 
1950s the USLL was adopted in ¾ of states. Regardless, at state level usury laws set interest rate 
caps, payday lenders found loopholes in the laws and developed maneuvers to keep high interest 
rates.17 And only in 2005, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIC) disseminated regulations 
dealing with theses affiliations of the law and set increased capital requirement and supplemented 
more inspection for Banks and other micro payday lenders.18  
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act (CCPA) were issued in 1914 and 1968 correspondingly to address loan collection 
practices of microlenders. According to FTC act, its own created commission of Federal trade got 
an authority collect information on peoples’ complaints about unfair lending practices. From the 
other hand, CCPA’s key provision requires calculations of all direct and indirect financial charges 
that lenders get as an overall amount from a borrower.  
Transparency related regulation. Another issue needed regulation not only in United 
States but also in other developed and developing countries, is the ambiguous and not transparent 
contract information micro-borrowers get from lenders. As the methods of interest rate 
calculations are usually complex, customers’ understanding of loan contracts are very low as well.  
For transparency issues in microlending processes, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was 
designed in 1968 in United States to promote the informed use of consumer credit.19 The TILA, 
being a part of CCPA, was supposed to bring stabilization and competitions among various 
lenders. The act requires Annual Percentage Rate (APR) calculation for consumer loans as well 
as for mortgage loan transactions. Authorities (The House Committee on Banking and Currency) 
issuing the act reported that American consumers will get all the necessary information to compare 
                                                 
17 As an example, lenders argued that their loans are not falling under the definition of the usury laws, and that 
borrowers are incurred fees rather than interest.  
18 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Deposit_Insurance_Reform_Act 
19 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_in_Lending_Act 
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the cost of credit and make well-informed decisions. The most specific requirements of TILA are 
included in Regulation Z promulgated by Federal Reserve Board. In turn, Regulation Z defines a 
“finance charge” as amount that is equal to the cost of credit for customer. Finance charge itself 
consists of interest, premiums, fees, and various other charges. 
After TILA came to existence, for more than a decade APR calculation were reported by 
lenders until 1980s, when auto producers found loophole in TILA and its administration. Basically, 
they found that the act and its administrators do not distinguish between terms “amount financed” 
and “finance charges”.20 Auto manufacturers took advantage from these gap, and by bundling the 
price of the car with other charges, essentially were even able to eliminate financing charge 
completely. Thereafter, the “zero percent APR was born.21  
Therefore, we can say that although the field of microlending is largely unregulated in 
United States, however, different legislative and usury acts concerning banking activities, for-
profit and non-profit organizations’ regulation, indirectly control microfinance activities in the 
country. Acts like Community Reinvestment, Equal Credit Opportunity, Program for Investment 
in Microentrepreneurs, The Dodd-Frank act, Consumer Credit Protection and other acts as well 
accompanied with different laws that set interest rate capping and capital adequacy requirements 
for non-banks institutions, constitute the overall regulatory framework of microfinance 
institutions.  
  
2.3. Regulation of microfinance institutions in European Union 
 
In this section, we will study the experience of microfinance regulation of such European 
countries as Germany, France, United Kingdom as well as Poland and Hungary as transiting 
countries. We will also describe briefly the policy of European Union toward microfinance 
regulation.    
 
 
 
                                                 
20 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tila.asp 
21 Indeed, buyers of automobiles have a choice to offer customers $1,000 (typical offer) rebate to get rid of 
interest, and as manufacturers can bundle the offer, credit unions, banks and other microlenders are left at a 
disadvantage.  
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Microfinance in Europe: overview 
 
In Europe microfinance originated from 16th century, when it became as an intermediation 
between micro-savings and micro-credits, having the goal of increasing poverty alleviation. 
Ireland and Germany are countries that have developed prototypes of current European 
microfinance. 
The history of Ireland microfinance dated back to 1720-1950, the period when financial 
innovation and conductive regulation pushed microfinance to grow at the beginning, and 
adversative regulation brought it down at the end (Seibel, 2005).  
The first Irish loan funds came to existence at 1720 as charities financed by donors. The 
loans offered by these funds were free of interest at the beginning, but very soon they transformed 
to intermediaries offering short term loans with peer guarantees. Even though there was moderate 
growth during the next century, however the funds flourished when two events took place. First, 
the law authorizing the funds to collect interest-bearing deposits and charging interest on loans 
issued in 1823, and second, Loan Fund Board was established as a regulatory and supervisory 
body in 1836. After these changes, the number of funds increased to 300 by 1840. 
As the deposit rates offered by funds were high than that’s of banks, the interest rates 
charged by funds were also higher. So far getting sources of self-financing from deposits and 
profits, the Irish funds took almost 20% market share from traditional banks. The latter threatened 
by increased competition from micro-lenders, Irish banks managed to lobby a law putting a cap 
on interest rates (Seibel). After, losing their advantages due to incomes from high interest rates, 
the Irish micro-lending funds slowly declined and completely disappeared in 1950s. 
The story of German microfinance is a good example of regulated microfinance sector 
created by self-help, self-regulated, and delegated supervision that started from the second half of 
18th century. It consists of two networks: community-owned savings funds called “Sparkassen”, 
and member-owned cooperatives. The first saving fund was in Hamburg in 1801 (Guichandut et. 
Al 2007). As Germans already learned from Irish experience that charity is not sustainable, and 
also the fact that demand for micro-savings was growing for poor people, all these factors pushed 
Saving funds change their business and offer credits. After, the Prussian state set up a regulation 
on this activity by passing Prussian Savings Banks Decree in 1838. As a respond, German savings 
funds association formed later in 1884.  
The second wave of German microfinance started after the hunger year of 1846/47. During 
these two years, the starvation was widespread and poor harvest made many farmers and small 
businesses go bankrupt. Only two courageous men took action after those days. In rural regions, 
Raiffeisen opened credit associations later known as Raiffeisenkassen, and in urban areas 
 37 
Schultze-Delitzsch established small business savings and credit cooperatives later called 
Volksbanken.  
Raiffeisen opened the first rural credit association in1964. The number of such associations 
slowly grew to 245 in 1880s. But when The Cooperative Act of German Reich was passed, the 
number of associations increased sharply reaching to 15,000 and spreading to other countries as 
well. According to the Act, the join liability of association was changed by limited liability, which 
allowed cooperatives to grow rapidly till the overall banking law was issued in 1934. All financial 
institutions were subject of regulation under the banking law and became universal banks of today. 
Both chains grew to enormous sizes and at the end of 20 comprised 39,000 branches, 75 million 
customers, 64% of all financial intermediation and 51.4% of all banking assets (Seibel).  
Generally, EC defines “microcredit” as: 
• a business microloan is a loan under EUR 25,000 to support the development of 
self-employment and microenterprises;  
• a personal microloan is a loan under EUR 25,000 for covering clients’ personal 
consumption necessities such as rent, personal emergencies, education. 
Although some factors such as a proper legal framework, effective delegated supervision, 
and institutional self-reliance without government interference have been crucial for the 
development of microfinance in European continent, however various European countries have 
taken different paths in microfinance.  
Surely, the experience of German and Irish microfinance will not illustrate how separate 
countries developed their own models of microfinance, and for more concrete judgement we 
should briefly analyze at least how microfinance developed in some European countries and what 
type of regulation have these countries on microfinance activities. 
 
Table 1: Microfinance Regulation and interest rate caps in USA and some EU countries22 
Country Microfinance Regulation Interest Rate Caps 
United States Small Business Jobs Act of 2010   No 
France Monetary and Financial Code Art R518-61   No 
  Germany No Specific Regulation   No 
United Kingdom No Specific Regulation   No 
    Poland No Specific Regulation  Yes 
   Hungary No Specific Regulation  Yes 
                                                 
22 Source by author 
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France 
 
The first microcredit organization in France was ADIE established in 1989.23 It was a time 
of very strict banking laws that prohibited any kind of non-bank borrowers from refinancing. For 
this reason, ADIE was loaning only from own funds, which limited the capability of the company 
to increase its portfolio. After Adie has carried out significant lobbying, some changes took place 
regarding the Banking laws. First, in 2001 some improvements in the law allowed microcredit 
associations to receive funding from banks. Then, in 2005 the Social Cohesion Fund (FCS) was 
formed to guarantee microcredit loans. According to official data published by Banque de France, 
in 2011 the FCS secured over 200m Euro in loans from banks. These guarantees offered by FCS 
made possible rapid expansion of microcredit market in France.  
In 2009, the state created the New Support for the Creation and companies’ buyout (the 
NACRE operation) that allows the development of interest-free loans by banks. Next year in 2010 
“The consumer law” was issued that directs consumer credit and specifies the legal framework for 
microfinance. This law permits associations to obtain interest-free loans from individuals. 
Moreover, in France microfinance associations currently can finance themselves through various 
crowdfunding platforms such as Babylon or Xetic (Bendig el., 2014).  
Generally, the microfinance sector in France distinguishes between two types: (1) Personal 
microcredit or Consumption loans to finance social and professional integration projects. (2) 
Professional microcredit or Professional loans to support of small businesses letting entrepreneurs 
to create their own jobs. Usually, the biggest part of total loans (over 80%) are professional 
microloans, while the remaining 20% goes to personal microloans.  
The other main actors of the market are France Active and France Initiative that are 
investing in various segments of the population. For example, Adie is active for unemployed and 
citizens with social minima, while France active is more inclined to loan unemployed and social 
entrepreneurs. 
Currently, the regulation of microfinance entities is based on two key legislations. The first 
one is Monetary and Financial Code from 15 May 2001 with its article L.511-6-5 and articles from 
L.518-57 to L.518-64, and the second is the Law from 18 January 2005.  
According to the article L.511-6-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code, non-profit 
associations are allowed to endow credits to unemployed people living on social benefits or for 
ones that want to create or develop their own new business. The loans are offered by associations 
which are borrowed by banks and/or from owners as an equity. In turn, the associations need to be 
                                                 
23 https://www.adie.org/microfinance-in-france 
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permitted by special committees to implement micro-crediting activities according to certain 
criteria. The all conditions and requirements to get permission are described in the articles L.518-
57 to L.518-64 of the Monetary and Financial Code. The main requirement is that loans are offered 
with interest not exceeding 6000 Euro and meet all the conditions of Banking Law which equally 
regulate both NGOs and commercial banks. 
The second is “The 18 January Law 2005”, which created the Social Cohesion Fund. As 
already mentioned The SCF provides financing to guarantee societies which provide guarantees 
to microcredit associations (EC, Expert Group Report, 2007). 
 
Germany 
 
Regardless the banking sector in Germany is quite efficient, young and small enterprises 
very often face special problems when seeking capital providers for their projects. Since 
cost/earnings ratio is usually low, microlending is often unprofitable for banks in Germany in the 
“conventional” way of doing lending business (Guichandut et al., 2007). 
The amounts of loans to entrepreneurs that are in the initial stage of their business are 
usually too small to cover the high risks and high operating costs, which are result of difficulties 
in assessment process of credibility and considerable risk of failure for start-up. Thus, small-scale 
projects very frequently fail because banks and other intermediaries are not willing to loan these 
young businesses and business ideas.  
In Germany, there are three types of non-bank entities providing microloans to 
entrepreneurs: (1) Microfinance Institutions, (2) promotional banks, and (3) local employment 
agencies (Bendig et al. 2014).  
Microfinance Institutions, due to their relatively small sizes, cannot get banking status. In 
Germany, these institutions are operating in local, regional and nationwide levels. Since 2004, in 
cooperation with banks, MFIs developed more advanced lending practices: cooperative banks 
distribute the loans, while MFIs serve the clients during the whole period of the loan. In case of 
default, the risk is divided equally between MFIs and guarantee funds so called “Mikrofinanzfonds 
Deutschland”. The latter were established based on this cooperation model, and since 2010 these 
funds increased to 100 million Euro.  
In contrast, promotional banks have the status of bank. Some banks have developed 
specific microloan products with such partners as ESF and ERDF, while others offer microloans 
below 25,000 Euro. Federal KfW provides clients loans with such conditions as well. 
Local employment agencies are responsible for lending those people that are long-term 
unemployed.  
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The main law in Germany regulating the activities of commercial banks, cooperative and 
saving banks, guarantee societies and NGOs is German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz KWG). 
It is a Federal law containing different acts for banks and other financial institutions. The main 
goal of KWG is to provide legislative basis for a functioning and secure credit service sector from 
one hand, and to protect the customers against losses from the other hand (EC, Expert Group 
Report, 2007). According to paragraph 32 of KWG, German Financial Supervisory Authority 
BAFIN should give a written permission to banks in order that they could conduct microlending.  
 
United Kingdom24  
 
Microfinance institutions in the UK are operating in various legal forms but are 
predominantly not-for-profit organizations that have social missions to assist local communities. 
Typically, microfinance approach in the United Kingdom is to help customers with advice, loan 
finance, mentoring, who stay out of banking financing. 
Both state and the banking sector play a significant role in the microfinance industry. From 
one side, the government assist with greater microfinance lending and private investment into 
MFIs, while from other side provides MFIs with funding such as grants that MFIs use as a third 
party to fix specific market failures or public needs.  
In its turn, the banking sector also plays a significant role. In the UK Banks and MFIs have 
a referral partnership, where banks recommend their declined customers to MFIs. Banks are also 
a source of funding for MFIs. 
So far, the main founders of CDFIs became public agencies. Regional Development 
Agencies (RDFIs) and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
combined with the nine English regions started to finance and support CDFIs. Banks, social 
investors, charitable trusts and foundations provide substantial support to CDFIs as well.  
In UK loans less than 25,000 Euro are defined as microfinance loans by CDFIs. Interest 
rates charged by the CDFIs varies from 0 to 26 %, the amount of loans is between 286 and € 9447 
(Goggin and Dayson, 2010), and the repayment period of microloans is kept at 18 to 60 months.  
The regulatory framework in the United Kingdom has recently changed. From multi-body 
financial regulatory system, in 2013, UK turned to centralized regulation system. The centralized 
body became the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) that regulates all firms providing consumer 
credit. As a result, the FCA has projected a more demanding regulatory regime, including higher 
                                                 
24  After 2016 June referendum UK should leave the EU in March 2019, source available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit  
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fees, than the previous regulator. Even though this kind of strict regulations are put extra burden 
for MFIs, however, the FCA with its new regulatory regimes intends to create a more ethical 
financial services industry in the UK, which will benefit MFIs as well. 
The main legislative acts regulating microfinance activities are Credit Unions Act and the 
Industrial & Provident Societies Act 1965.  
Credit Unions are obliged to register under the Industrial & Provident Societies Act issued 
in 1965 to get corporate status. Credit Unions Act that was issued in 1979, governs the provisions 
of activities that credit unions implement. According to Credit Unions Act loans may only be made 
to natural persons, who share a common tie. However, some of these loans will be used by sole 
traders for business purposes. 
Also, credit unions are regulated by the Financial Services Authority under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act from 2000 that authorizes unions and specifies which operations they 
can implement. CDFIs may registered as companies regulated under Company law or as 
community benefit societies registered under the Industrial & Provident Societies Act issued in 
1965. 
Poland 
 
In Poland there are three main types of institutions that operate actively in microfinance 
field: (1) Microcredit organizations that only lend, (2) “Loans funds” which offer nit only loans 
but other business development services. These funds operate in forms of regional funds or local 
foundations, (3) Banks that loan mainly Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises (MSMEs).  
While Grameen Bank succeeded in Asia, at the same time Fundusz Mikro in Poland 
became the most successful microfinance organization of Eastern Europe. It was established in 
1994 by the Polish-American Business Foundation (PAEF) with the aim of promoting micro 
business in the country. Now, there are more than 30 branches operating in all regions.  
The Fund offers its microloan services with following principles (Guichandut et al. 2007): 
(1) the loan is issued for a period of 3 months; (2) the average loan size is $ 1,500; (3) the effective 
interest rate is 35%; (4) 55% of all borrowers are women. What is important that the level of loan 
repayment is 98%. 
Aside from Fundusz Mikro, two other microcredit funds are operating in Poland, which 
specialized to help businesses in agriculture: (1) The Polish Agricultural Development Fund 
(PADF), a private non-profit organization founded in 1998 for development and support of 
agricultural activities, (2) The second fund is the Agricultural Fund (AF), which was established 
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by the Ministry of Agriculture and Economy of Poland in 1991 and focuses on start-up projects 
(the main condition to receive credit is a 40-100-hour training of a business course).  
There is no specific regulation and laws in Poland for microfinance activities. A range of 
institutions such as banks, credit unions, cooperatives, foundations, associations and other NGOs 
can provide microloans. All these institutions are guided under general regulation such as civil, 
commercial, and labor codes, banking laws and regulations, as well as, Act of competition and 
consumer protection, and personal data protection act (Bendig et al. 2014). 
The act on competition and consumer protection was issued in 2007 and protects consumer 
interests in three directions such as transparent contract terms, distribution of inaccurate and false 
data, and unfair competition practices. Only banks and credit unions are allowed to take deposits 
and providing of client data to credit bureau is not obligatory for MFIs. 
In Poland, from 2005 there is also regulatory cap on interest rates of 16% (four times the 
central bank Lombard rate of 4%) (Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014), however, due to the loopholes 
of legislation, microfinance institutions can apply different fees and charges so increasing the full 
cost of the credit. Recently, companies engaged in PDL segment, have received much criticism 
about the fair cost of credit. In response, the polish government intends to make changes in the 
law regarding the supervision of non-bank microfinance institutions, and to set limits on the full 
cost of credit. 
Hungary 
 
In Hungary, the implementation of microfinance programs is carried out by the Hungarian 
Enterprise Support Fund (HESF), founded in 1990 with the aim of providing financial support to 
small and medium-sized businesses, which created an extensive branch network consisting of 20 
representative offices so called local enterprise agencies (LEA).  
Only in the first 4 years of existence, HESF issued approximately 1,000 loans in the amount 
of $ 3 million. Due to crises, it became almost impossible for SMEs to get bank loans, the objective 
of microfinance was changed many times as well. According to the Overview of microcredit sector 
in EU (2014), the value of microloans granted amounted to 46,7 million Euro. 
The next step in the development of the microfinance system in Hungary was the creation 
of the State Committee on Microcredit, which introduced conceptual changes in the microcredit 
system. Since 2004, the microcredit management has been transferred to the Hungarian 
Development Bank, which started from 2005 to implement the "Microcredit Plus" program, in 
which microcredits are provided to borrowers through local business associations that also carry 
out their monitoring. 
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Generally, there are no legal framework regulating microfinance sector in Hungary. 
However, there are special rules that regulate the operation of micro-lending institutions.  
In 1998, the Hungarian Parliament revised Act No. CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and 
Financial Enterprises in a way that it excluded the activities performed by those LEAs that don’t 
comply with the act’s requirements. Although there is no legal obligation regarding the creation 
of lending rules for LEAs, but the regulations developed are in line with requirements of The Act 
on Credit Institutions. For the regulation of foundation, there is also a Microcredit Manual, which 
contains the detailed rules of the Microcredit Program (EC, Expert Group Report, 2007). 
 
Going back to microfinance in EU as a union, we should state that microfinance industry 
in Europe has emerged from both the “Developing world” and the United States, combined with 
some historical patterns. As we saw, the biggest part of microfinance in European union is 
provided by funds from the state and to a lesser extent from banks. Also, we saw that each country 
in Europe has its own exceptional microfinance sector with some similarities and distinctions from 
others in the region. 
Having, however, all these differences, the authorities of the Union tried to standardize and 
harmonize the practices of interest rates estimation and full information disclosure for European 
customers with the aim of unified customer protection in all member states. For this purpose, the 
European Parliament and The Council issued the Directive 98/7/EC on the single method of 
Annual Percentage Rate estimation in February 1998. The goal of the directive with the 
standardization of APR was directed to the transparency and consumer rights announcing that 
every creditor has to use the form when marketing a consumer credit in any member state.  
Afterward, the directives 2008/48/EC and 2011/90/EC came to existence on credit 
agreements for customers, which supplemented the Directive of 98/7/EC. All these directives 
reinforced the EU regulation toward microlending practices and forced member states to fully 
obey the directives already started from 2013. 
Likewise, European Commission issued the European Code of Good Conduct for 
Microcredit Provision in 2011. As stated in the provision, the importance of Code of Conduct for 
the promotion of best in the field of microfinance is very high due to the diversity of lending 
practices in member countries. As the authors of the code mentions the latter is not for the 
replacement of existing regulation but rather it is intended to detail a set of common standards in 
terms of operation and reporting of microlending providers. 
The Code targets microcredit provider managers, directors, customers, investors, funders, 
owners, regulators, and partner organizations. It is not obligatory for implementation but very 
advisable for all microfinance institutions that are engaged in microlending activities. 
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The main aspects The Code touches are: sufficient information to customers, customer 
rights, avoiding over-indebtedness, customer care, ethical staff, customer data protection, investor 
relations, governance and management of microfinance institutions as well.  
According to the news published in microfinance network website, Europe’s first 
microcredit provider (MCP) to receive certification for compliance with the European Code of 
Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision is the Dutch company Qredits. Qredits was founded as a 
non-profit organization in 2009 to contribute to the social and financial inclusion of micro-
entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. 
 
2.4. Regulation of microfinance institutions in Southeast Asia  
 
In this section, we will study the experience of microfinance development and regulation 
in two Southeast countries: Bangladesh and India. Both countries do have well-developed and 
diverse microfinance industry, which will allow us to make proper comparisons with Russian 
microfinance industry in later chapters.  
 
Bangladesh 
 
It’s believed that microfinancing takes its roots in 1976 from Bangladesh. Professor 
Muhammad Yunus, seeing how his fellows are suffering from high rate loans from envy 
moneylenders, started himself lending low rates loans to poor people to support their small 
businesses. The business model became viable, and non-return rate was 3% in comparison to 
today’s 30% average that we have in microfinance market in Russia. Later, Yunus opened his 
Grameen Bank, which has issued US$6.38 billion to 7.4 million borrowers by July 2007.25 Only 
after almost 30 years, in 2006, Yunus was awarded a Noble prize for his contribution to “the 
economic and social development from bottom”. So, Yunus has developed and implemented a 
new approach to micro lending in Grameen Bank, which includes such elements as group 
contracting, dynamic lending mode, regular and frequent repayment of the loan received, absence 
of collateral.  
Bangladesh microfinance sector is one of the oldest and most diverse in the world, which 
includes such largest and sophisticated microfinance institutions as Grameen Bank, BRAC, and 
ASA.  
                                                 
25 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Yunus#Early_career 
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Microfinance has been operating in Bangladesh for almost forty years. In 2014, 33,73 
million of clients (including Grameen Bank) were being served with various financial and non-
financial services by 742 registered microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh (MRA, 2015) 
Currently, microcredit programs in Bangladesh are implemented by NGOs, Grameen 
Bank, state-owned commercial banks, private commercial banks, and specialized programs of 
some ministries of Bangladesh government.26  
Initially, the microfinance sector was not regulated in Bangladesh, and there was not a 
regulatory authority to control and supervise microfinance activities. Before 2006, MFIs were 
registered under various acts. As the sector succeeded and grew worldwide, the need for regulation 
has also gradually increased.  
After number of meetings, discussions, recommendations from the participation of 
Bangladesh Bank, Ministry of Finance, social welfare Ministry, and major participants of the 
sector, The Steering Committee offered its regulatory framework only in 2003, which the 
government accepted.  
In 2006, almost three decades after the initiation of microfinance in Bangladesh by Yunus 
and Grameen Bank, an independent regulatory authority was established, known as the 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) after The Act 32 was enacted 2006. 
The initial goal of the establishment of the MRA was to create a favorable and healthy 
atmosphere for microfinance practices in the country and to protect the interests of clients of MFIs, 
but meanwhile not hurting the long-term sustainability of MFIs. For this MRA has issued and 
provide MFIs with detailed guidelines to increase governance practices. In addition, MRA 
advocates for prudential policy design, superior competition, productivity and efficiency for long-
term sustainability of the sector (MRA, 2015).27 
With the enactment of the Microcredit Regulatory Authority Act, all NGO-MFIs were put 
under the control of MRA. However, other types of MFIs, such as cooperatives, credit unions, 
non-bank financial institutions, and state-owned or commercial banks engaged in microlending 
activities are not under the jurisdiction of the MRA. All these institutions are supervised under the 
corresponding Acts of their particular authorities, from which they have obtained their operating 
licenses (Mia A. 2017). 
Each MFI should receive a license from the MRA to carry out microfinance activities in 
the country. To guarantee transparency and accountability of microfinance operations and 
                                                 
26 Source available at http://www.mra.gov.bd/images/mra_files/News/mcinbd17082015.pdf 
27 Resource available at http://www.mra.gov.bd 
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activities, the authority is implementing the removal of licenses from MFIs that fail to obey 
requirements set by the MRA.  
The MRA has issued different set of rules and requirements regarding MFis membership, 
loan conditions, funding and segment sustainability related obligations from very beginning of 
foundation.  
The MRA has enacted a regulation capping microfinance institution (MFI) loan rates at 27 
percent per year as of July 2011. In 2009, MRA temporarily fixed interest rates at a 15 percent flat 
rate or 30 percent effective rate (Khandker et al. 2013). 
 
India 
 
India has an excellent microfinance history predates by two to three millenniums. In 
ancient India, microfinance existed in the form of intermediation including deposit taking, lending 
and other financial services known as merchant banking at these days.  
In the middle ages, due to the rapid growth of trade between India and Asian countries 
merchant banking surged as well. The merchants were charging interest rates between 0.5% and 
1.25% per month on secured loans and between 40 to 60% per trade venture on risky trade (Seibel, 
2005). Other forms of informal finance existed in the form of micro lending by money lenders, 
traders, merchant bankers, chit fund companies and Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAS).28  
The oldest type of informal microfinance is the money lenders who existed probably 1700 
to 2200 years ago, after which this profession became an organized one and demanded subsequent 
regulation. Money lenders still exist in both rural and urban India with some of the historical 
remnants of this profession. 
As the business of all these informal microlenders grew, the need for regulation of these 
activities grew as well. Different legislative acts were passed to regulate activities of informal 
microlenders already in the second half of the 20th century.  
In parallel, the formal sector of microfinance also grew mainly due to the efforts of the 
Indian government and the Reserve Bank of India. The Indian cooperative movement started after 
the government of Madras stated its willingness to use German cooperative movement to decrease 
the poverty in India. This happened after the Britishers promoted credit cooperatives to serve their 
                                                 
28 Resource available at http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/ 
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trade interest and later enacted the Cooperative Credit Societies Act in 1904 and Multi-Unit 
Cooperative Societies Act in 1942. 
So far, the government initiated the microfinance movement through various formal 
channels and programs making India the country that give birth to many types of microfinance 
models. As the range of entities in Indian microfinance sector varies from Banks to non-profit 
lenders, it is always difficult to identify of appropriate regulation for MFIs in general.  
There are certain prudential requirements for microfinance loans to acquire priority sector 
status. The majority of microfinance in India is provided by commercial banks, regional rural 
banks (RRBs), SHGs (very often with special linkage programs to commercial banks), cooperative 
societies, and microfinance institutions (MFIs) that take a variety of forms, including NGOs and 
non-bank financial companies (NBFCs). 
According to CGAP, different microfinance entities in India are regulated by various 
authorities correspondingly: (1) Banks and NBFCs are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) with the National Bank for Agriculture; (2) Rural Development (NABARD) is supervising 
and inspecting RRBs; (3) SHGs are regulated by NABARD; (4) cooperative societies are regulated 
by the state-appointed Registrar of Cooperative Societies (RCS) and state government (with 
NABARD conducting supervision and inspections); and (4) and cooperative banks are regulated 
by RBI and RCS.  
RBI resolved its lack of capacity to supervise the microfinance sector by creating a 
framework for monitored self-regulation. Moreover, since not all MFIs are registered as NBFCs, 
hundreds of them fall outside of the regulatory scheme. So far Self-Regulatory Organization 
(SRO) status was granted first to the Microfinance Institutions Network (MFIN), a trade 
association composed of 47 Indian microlenders that operate as non-banking financial companies, 
and then to Sa-Dhan, a microfinance network with 251 members.  
SROs are required to develop a code of conduct for their members, to guarantee 
compliance, as well as to establish an effective grievance redressal system for borrowers and a 
system for resolving disputes between member organizations (Directive of RBI on SRO for 
NBFC-MFI from November 26, 2013).  
Under pressure from RBI, MFIN has created a code of conduct in order to prevent over-
lending to individual borrowers, to conduct more ethical microlending, as well as to create social 
benefits and promote financial inclusion in the country.  
MFIN states the core values of its code of conduct that all member should follow: These 
core values include such important aspects of microfinance activities as:  
- integration of low-income citizens to financial services,  
- providing quality services to clients 
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- providing complete and accurate information 
- providing fair practices against fraud, misrepresentation, deception or unethical 
practices 
- protecting privacy of client information 
- integration of social values into operations 
- creation of feedback and grievance redressal mechanism 
Later, the second SRO Sa-Dhan developed its own code of conduct titled “Core Values 
and Voluntary Mutual Code of Conduct for Microfinance Institutions”, which is also directed to 
the core values mentioned above.  
Actually, RBI has issued its guidelines on Fair Practices Code for NBFCs-Grievance 
Redressal Mechanism in March 2012, and SROs developed their Code of Conduct based on the 
requirements and recommendation from this guideline.  
 
Summary 
 
Analyzing the experience of foreign countries in microfinance, we can identify the main 
common features of microfinance activities abroad. 
Different countries have diverse organizational and legal form of institutions, which 
provides microfinance in foreign countries as credit unions, commercial Banks, non-governmental 
organizations, leasing companies, National Bank, associations, self-organized group, supplier, 
traders, etc. 
Regulation of the activities of microfinance entities also differs depending on the issues 
this regulation solves as well as effectiveness of distinct type of regulation in a country.  
From above discussed countries, all have regulation directed to such main issues as high 
or so called “exploitative” interest rates, implicit extra charges by MFIs, and absence of discloser 
full information on loan conditions to borrowers. Both developed countries such as United States, 
German, France, UK, and developing ones as Bangladesh, India, have issued legislation regarding 
these issues. Particularly, in all these countries there are interest rates caps that are set to prevent 
loan sharking practices and some unscrupulous MFIs’ desire to earn extra high profits.  
Regarding the combination and specific of different types of regulation, we can state that 
there are three main patterns: (1) there are countries such as Bangladesh where there is total state 
regulation of all organizations involved in microfinance; (2) There are also countries such as 
United States, Germany, Poland, Hungary, in which there are no specific regulation for MFIs and 
government agencies regulate the activities of only large organizations, since the latter provide 
clients with microfinance services and present a certain potential threat to market stability of the 
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country; (3) there are countries such as India, where there is self-regulation of microfinance 
activities. This does not mean directly that the organization exists by itself without any regulation, 
rather it as a rule establishes internal control rules, corporate governance rules and disclosure. 
From one side, the state tries not to interfere in management, since micro-agencies are not sources 
of potential systemic risk, and the regulation is not financially justified. In addition, the 
requirement of reporting is kept, however the state does not implement prudential supervision. In 
India the need for self-regulation is also comes from the fact that there is huge diversity of 
microfinance providers, and the regulator could not manage the regulation of all participants of 
the market. 
Trying to answer the question when and how self-regulation failed or succeeded, we should 
state that there is a general pattern noticed in all countries discussed in this chapter. When the 
number of microfinance institutions and microloan portfolio grow in a country, the abuses 
regarding different non-benevolent practices by MFIs also grow. As a rule, this circumstance 
makes countries to go to more structured and authorized industry regulation, which we saw in all 
countries discussed. 
 From one side, the very argument that state regulation is directed to the prevention of 
unethical or illegal practices and customer protection, justifies the state regulation effectiveness, 
and all above mentioned countries adopted this strategy of industry regulation. However, from the 
other side, when the regulation is not directed to the balanced and thorough analysis of business 
of MFIs, such regulation might be very ineffective and harm MFIs’ sustainability.     
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Chapter 3. Regulation and self-regulation of microfinance organizations 
in Russia 
In this chapter, we will try to apply our theoretical framework to the microfinance sector 
of Russia. In section 3.1 we will describe the development of this market in Russia and from where 
it takes its roots. Then we will go to discuss the ethical issues and unscrupulous practices of the 
industry as well as will make brief market overview to show the overall picture of microfinance 
market in Russia in section 3.2. Afterward, we will turn to the discussion of the main legislation 
regarding MFIs’ activities and regulation in section 3.3. We will try to describe the key issues that 
the existing legislation tries to regulate. Finally, in section 3.4 we will describe the role of SROs 
in the process of self-regulation, trying to specify the main functions of SROs regarding effective 
self-regulation of MFOs.         
   
3.1. The history of microfinance development in Russia 
 
Origins of microfinance in Russia 
 
The manifestations of microfinance can already be found in medieval history. According 
to a number of researchers, the first microfinance organizations in Russia can be considered 
monasteries, which were the largest creditors of the time. But it should be borne in mind that the 
main borrowers of the monasteries that let the accumulated capital "grow" were merchants rather 
well-off, or at least business people, who offered considerable profits on the invested funds even 
in combination with significant risk (Mamuta 2009). It is true that the monasteries gave money 
and the poor - but they were more regarded as social programs, since no one particularly expected 
either a high return or a profitability of operations.  
From the history of Tsarist Russia, we know that like current microcredit organizations, in 
19th centuries in Russia emerged so called credit unions and partnerships that could be considered 
as a prototype of current microcredit institutions of Russia. It happened after the abolition of 
selfdom in Russian Empire in 1895, when lots of small owners were in a dire need of loan capital. 
Taking loans from The State Bank, these partnerships begun distributing funds between peasants, 
artisans and small traders whose solvency they were able to assess. By the end of 19th century, 
there were near 700 such mutual credit societies with overall 6,500,000 rubles (Ezrokh 2013).  
At the beginning of the 20th century, the cooperative financial movement reached its 
heyday in the Russian Empire, uniting by 1913 more than 12 million citizens and entrepreneurs. 
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The average loan size in this system is about 300 rubles, which at that time is a significant amount 
(Mamuta 2009). Then the ways of development of cooperative finance in Russia, Europe and 
North America differ - financial institutions were destroyed and preserved only in the form of its 
meager similarity in the form of "mutual funds" in Soviet enterprises, while in the West, 
cooperatives are not simply step by step cover municipalities, but also become one of the main 
financial institutions of local development. 
However, in 1930s these credit cooperatives practically collapsed, after which almost 60 
years USSR State Bank performed all functions of lending to individuals and legal entities. The 
main types of loans were so called "working credit": (1) short-term (before the salary); (2) long-
term (up to 6 months). And its size could not exceed 50 and 150% of the borrower's salary, 
respectively. Long-term loans were issued exclusively shareholders of consumer cooperation. In 
the years 1925-1926 in structure of the working credit was dominated by the petty- (62%), while 
the long-term share accounted for 38% (Ezrokh 2013). 
During the existence of the USSR pawnshops did not were of such a leading importance 
both in the Russian Empire: for 1984, the volume of loans pawnshops was 630 million rubles, 
while the cash mutual assistance granted 1,777 million rubles. In USSR there was many mutual 
aid cashboxes MACs:  as of 01.01.1998 - 97.4 thousand units. The average capital of which was 
13.5 thousand rubles. The average number of members of the MACs was 110 people. The 
membership to MACs was not difficult, only 0.5% a month deduction from wage. If necessary, 
the member of the association could receive a short-term (up to a salary) or long-term loan on 
preferential terms, i.e. without accrual of interest. The value of long-term loan was limited to 10 
months when borrowing more than 300 rubles. (Ezrokh 2013).  
  
Microfinance progress in 1990-2010 
 
When the microfinance market was established in Russia, the American model also was 
taken as a basis, and emphasis was placed on the development of private entrepreneurship. As a 
result, numerous consumer and rural cooperatives began to appear after. The shareholders of these 
funds unite their temporarily free funds to use them for issuing microloans to their members under 
guarantees or pledges. Those, in turn, could use this money for business development or consumer 
needs. 
The law "On State Support of Small Entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation" 
established the direct impact of the state on the microfinance sector through the State Committee 
on Support and Development of Small Business. Later in 2000, the committee was disbanded due 
to its inefficiency, and its functions were transferred to the “Antimonopoly Service”. The Law and 
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the activities of the Committee have brought to life numerous budget and private funds supporting 
small businesses, most of which currently carry out microfinance activities.  
However, the German model for the development of the microfinance sector was also 
applied in Russia, which was represented by the structure of interaction between JSC “Russian 
Bank for SME Support” (SME Bank) and microfinance institutions.  
While some authors posit that Russian microfinance takes roots from American model, the 
others argue that German prototype is also applicable for Russian microfinance. Trying to escape 
such a contradiction among scholars, we would better to identify Russian model of microfinance 
development with the help of explanation offered by Yakunin and Gorskaya (2012). According to 
these authors, a large differentiation of the standard of living in different regions allows to 
conclude that while in one region MFIs create workplaces, in others it is a way to get out of 
poverty. Therefore, to talk about preference in using development of a particular model in Russia 
is not a right decision.  
Even though the Federal Law "On Microfinance Activities and Microfinance 
Organizations" came into existence only in 2011, microfinance organizations have been operating 
in Russia for quite some time. 
A new stage in the activity of credit cooperatives began in the 90s of the 20th century, 
when the command economy warped, and emphasis was placed on the development of private 
entrepreneurship. In the new Russia, numerous consumer and rural cooperatives began to appear, 
the shareholders of which unite their temporarily free funds to use them for issuing microloans to 
their members under guarantees or pledges. Those, in turn, could use this money for business 
development or consumer needs.  
However, such organizations did not enjoy wide popularity because of mistrust on the part 
of ordinary citizens. Many Russians still remember how in those years the pyramids like “MMM” 
"boomed", which deprived many citizens of their last savings. Basically, during these years 
microfinance organizations earned its “weird and unscrupulous” reputation that was fixed in 
collective mind of people till now. Even nowadays the legacy of this distrust toward microfinance 
organizations continues to exist among the population. However, despite this, microfinance 
continued to exist and grew. 
Another factor explaining such an unkindly reputation of MFIs among Russians is that fact 
that the market was not regulated at all started from very 1990s until 2010 when the law came to 
existence. During these years, virtually everybody was able to be engaged in such kind of 
activities, lending high percent loans to people needed money for various reasons. Very often, the 
return of these loans was not done in a legal way, and the creditors were using both phycological 
and physical force to influence on borrowers to return debts.  
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As a result, without regulations, State control and established rules, many individuals and 
entities were engaged in micro-crediting, and created enormous wealth on the others “grief”.  
It’s noteworthy that this period, as well as the period of the first half of the 2000s, is 
characterized by an absence of legislative base regulating the functioning of these organizations. 
As a result, lots of inevitable uncertainties regarding the interaction of organizations with 
customers emerged shading the development of microfinance market in general. 
For the first time, the activity on granting loans to legal entities that are not credit 
institutions was evaluated in the information letter No. C1-7 / OP-555 of the Supreme Arbitration 
Court of the Russian Federation of 10.08.1994 "On Selected Recommendations Adopted at 
Meetings on Judicial Arbitration Practice" (hereinafter - information letter) issued even before the 
adoption of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.  
Paragraph 4 of this information letter clarifies that when the organization provides its free 
funds under a loan agreement, including conditions of payment of certain interest, if such activity 
is not directly prohibited by law and is not systematic, a license for banking operations is not 
required. 
Basically, the “Civil Code of Russian Federation” adopted in October 1994 and the law 
“On non-profit organizations” issued in December 1995, accompanied by the law “On State 
Support of Small Entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation” adopted in May 1995, were the only 
legal documents that somehow regulated microfinance activities in Russia up to 2010.  
While the article №160 of Civil Code was about written form of transactions stating the 
conditions of contacting between interest sides, the article №7 of the law “On non-profit 
organizations” was about funds and in which activities these funds could be engaged.  
The real growth of the microfinance market in Russia began in 2004, when the economic 
situation in Russia stabilized after the crisis of the 1990s. So, if in 2003 there were only 150 
organizations engaged in microfinance, by the end of 2008 there were already 2750, and by the 
end of 2011 - about 9000 29 . This growth was a consequence of increased solvency and 
creditworthiness of individuals and SME entities. 
As the number of participants and microfinance market grew, the need for organization of 
the segment grew as well. For this purpose, Russian Microfinance Center (RMC) was created 
in 2002.  
                                                 
29  Source from monitoring reports of Russian Microfinance Center, resource available at 
http://rmcenter.ru/analitics/materialy_i_publikatsii/) 
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So far RMC assists the poor and socially unaffected population in Russia to win poverty 
through business development and initiative, the RMC takes an active part in charitable activities, 
raising the standard of living in Russia30. 
RMC serves as a resource center for the microfinance sector and a kind of middle unit 
among microfinance institutions, government, society and investors. The center also helps to the 
formation of a favorable legal environment, provides professional training and consulting services 
to microfinance organizations, and promotes the implementation of national microfinance 
standards. 
Later, The National Partnership of Microfinance Market Participants (NAUMI), 
registered on April 7, 2006 by The Association of Russian Banks, The Association of Small and 
Medium Business Support Agencies "DEVELOPMENT", The Russian Microfinance Center and 
the National Association of Non-Profit Organizations for Financial Mutual Assistance.  
The partnership develops standards of microfinance activities with participants and 
promotes their implementation, supports the development of new technologies for microfinance 
services, promotes the formation of a positive image of microfinance activities, performs 
representative functions in the interests of its participants. 
Basically, NAUMIR carries the responsibility of so called “political” part of the job 
organizing business events at the federal and international level and providing the interaction 
of legislative and executive authorities, public organizations, microfinance institutions and their 
associations, as well as mass media.  
 
3.2. Microfinance industry overview and existing ethical issues 
 
Currently, in Russian Federation Microfinance Institutions include such entities as 
pawnshops, credit consumer cooperatives, agricultural consumer credit cooperatives, housing 
funded cooperatives, microfinance organizations and microfinance organizations of business 
financing.  
                                                 
30 http://rmcenter.ru/about/ 
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Figure 2: Structure of the microfinance segment in Russia31 
 
The main target groups for Russian MFOs are Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), 
Individual Entrepreneurs (IEs) and low-income individuals.  
Basically, there are three major segments in which Russian MFOs are operating: (1) Ones 
that give microcredits to small and medium business. The credit amount is constrained by 1 million 
rubles usually for maximum 1 year; (2) MFOs that give Pay Day Loans in amount of 1-20 thousand 
rubles at 1,5-3% a day for very short term, and finally (3) MFOs that lend consumer loans from 
10 to 100 thousand rubles at 7-21% per year for maximum a half year. The share of overdue loans 
for first group is dramatically low, while for PDL segment the same measure is 20-25% and for 
MFO giving consumer loans is 15-18% (Solodukhina 2015).  
According to The Bank of Russia’s annual report on 2017, there were registered 2271 
organizations by 01.01.2018, while there were 2588 organizations by 01.01.2017. As we can see, 
the number or registered MFOs decreased 12,25% during 2017. Regarding the membership of 
MFOs to SROs, 2145 organizations were members of 3 SROs at 01.01.2018, while there were 
2379 organizations-members of SROs at 01.01.2017 (Annual report 2017). 
As of 31.12.2017 the aggregate portfolio of microloans increased by 28.0% and amounted 
to 112.8 billion rubles. However, by 01.01.2018 among the number of MFOs only 60 are 
registered as MFCs and 2157 as MCCs. Despite this huge difference in quantity, by 01.01.2018 
MFCs earned 52.4% of total profit of MFOs.  
                                                 
31 Source from Starostin 2014 
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In the portfolio of MFIs of consumer microfinance, the share of non-serviceable over 90 
days of microloans (NPL 90+) was 30.3% (Annual report 2017). At the same time, this value in 
the MFI sector declined by 8.9 percentage points since the beginning of 2017, which was due to 
the outstripping growth rate of the portfolios of the largest MFIs (including the segment of online 
microloans). The cumulative increase in the portfolio of micro-loans was provided mainly due to 
the inflow of borrowed funds from legal entities (other than credit institutions) and individuals 
(including founders), the amount of debt to which increased over the year by 46.5 and 28.1%, 
respectively 
The share of funds provided by individuals or individual entrepreneurs (non-founders) in 
the total amount of funds raised from individuals or individual entrepreneurs was 94.7% for the 
MFCs and 10.2% for the MCCs. 
Before stating the main ethical problems that currently exist in the industry, it would be 
better to describe briefly the attitude toward the industry. 
Generally, MFОs are believed to be addressed by people with insufficient creditworthiness, 
with a damaged credit history and with high credit load. In general, these are people who were 
denied by banks for diverse reasons. But this statement is not always true, as the high availability 
of microcredit, along with the convenience of receiving it, allows an ordinary citizen to take a loan 
for any needs without explaining the purposes.  
Very often, people getting attractive offers from microfinance organizations, misjudge 
their own financial opportunities to return the borrowed money, which then have a “prison effect” 
on them. As the credit amount is doubled or tripled due to high fines and penalties, people find 
themselves locked taking loans again and again to pay the previous ones, a phenomenon called 
“Financial Funnel”. The amount of the debt grows and eventually a person becomes insolvent. 
And Yunus’s basic idea of social microfinancing turns to be a disaster for number of individuals 
in micro level and for social-economic progress of the country in macro level. 
Regarding the main ethical issues and unscrupulous practices that MFOs are abused for, 
we will adhere mainly to the paper of Solodukhina (2015), as it is the most recent work thoroughly 
analyzing the ethical issues of current microfinance industry in Russia. Moreover, Solodukhina’s 
paper is focusing on Pay Day Loans segment, which receives the biggest part of abuses regarding 
unscrupulous practices toward customers.  
Therefore, the research done by Solodukhina revealed the following specific problems:  
• Information asymmetry (opacity) - In most cases Russian MFOs do not disclose the 
essential characteristics of the proposed product (such as penalties, repayment scheme, possibility 
of extension or early repayment, etc.), 
• High interest rates (more than 600% annual in PDL segment), 
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• Unscrupulous collection practices, 
• Signing of application-offer, after which a consumer signing the application, 
simultaneously subscribes to the fact that all the terms of the loan are known to him, and most 
importantly, that he is aware of the consequences of non-performance, 
• Limiting the possibility of early repayment. The possibility of early repayment in 
the vast majority of cases is limited to one or another of the conditions - from the need to warn the 
lender to the explicit prohibition of redemption within a certain period and the imposition of 
penalties, 
• Non-compliance with the principles of responsible lending. MFOs do not find out 
whether the structure of income and expenses allows the borrower to repay the debt on time, 
• Disproportionately high fines, 
• Lack of alternative solutions for low-income people who are in need, 
• Aggressive marketing policy - MFOs use several techniques to attract customers, 
which can be unambiguously classified as aggressive and even viral marketing activities. 
Above mentioned problems are the most common and the most discussed issues that relate 
to current microfinance industry. So, the regulation of the industry should be directed to prevent 
these unethical issues and practices. 
 
3.3. Main legislation affecting microfinance organizations in Russia  
 
Currently, in Russian Federation Microfinance organizations are regulated by several state 
laws as well as normative acts of Bank of Russia.  
As already noted, current microfinance in Russia was developed after Soviet Union 
breakdown, however the law on microfinance organizations was issued when the industry matured 
enough. So, the law №151 "On Microfinance Activities and Microfinance Organizations", 
adopted in 2010, helped to get rid of many fraudsters and made the activities of MFOs more 
transparent. It was from 2010 in Russia that the era of “civilized” microfinance, controlled by the 
state, began. And the state represented by the Federal Service for Financial Markets at the 
beginning and by The Bank of Russia from September 1, 2013, is increasingly monitoring this 
developing market. 
The law states “a microfinance organization is a legal entity that carries out microfinance 
activities and information about which is included in the state register of microfinance 
organizations in the manner provided for by this Federal Law. Microfinance organizations can 
operate in the form of a microfinance companies or microcredit companies” (FL №151). Many 
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experts believe that this division of microfinance institutions in two groups is one of the most 
major changes in the context of MFO regulations directed to the recovery of the whole market.  
The law clearly distinguishes between two types of microfinance organizations. 
Microfinance Companies (hereinafter MFCs) should have 70 million rubles own capital, can take 
deposits from individuals for an amount not less than 1.5 million rubles, and the maximum amount 
of microcredit is 1 million rubles. From the other side, Microcredit Companies (hereinafter MCCs) 
are not allowed to admit deposits from individuals and to credit online, have a 500.000 rubles limit 
for crediting and are free from own capital requirement. However, both types of organizations are 
controlled equally by the Law “On Microfinance Activities and Microfinance Organizations”, by 
the Law “on Consumer Credit (loan)” and by other normative acts of Central Bank. 
The law states, for example, the criteria for funders and management of microfinance 
organizations, and in this way dramatically reducing the access of unscrupulous participants into 
the industry. Also, in the law there is a separate article on self-regulated organizations and the 
requirements for all microfinance organizations to member SRO. According to the law “A self-
regulating organization in the financial market realizes control over compliance by the 
microfinance organizations that are members of this self-regulatory organization with the 
requirements of this Federal Law and the regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation adopted 
in accordance with it and the regulations of the Bank of Russia”.  
The law then states the details of lending conditions such as currency of a loan, some 
internal documentation specifics, the procedure of contracting, and also rights and responsibilities 
of both microfinance organizations and borrowers 
More importantly, the Law states in Article 12.1 the features of accrual of interest and other 
payments in case of delay in performance of loan obligations. According to this article “after the 
appearance of the delay in the fulfillment of the obligation of the borrower to repay the loan 
amount and/or the payment of the interest due, the microfinance organization, under the consumer 
loan agreement, the repayment period of the consumer loan for which does not exceed one year, 
may continue to charge the borrower but only the part of the principal amount.  
Interest on the portion of the principal debt that is not repaid by the borrower continues to 
accrue until the total amount of the interest payable is equal to the amount of the double amount 
of the outstanding portion of the loan.  
In its turn, Federal Law №353 "On consumer credit" issued in December 2013 specifies 
that all professional creditors, including banks, MFOs, pawnshops and credit consumer 
cooperatives, are required to follow uniform rules for issuing loans, which leads to a higher level 
of consumers’ rights. At the same time, microfinance organizations are obliged to disclose to their 
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customers the cost of credit, that is, the amount of overpayment for the use of loan funds. In turn, 
citizens can simply compare the interest rates of different MFOs and choose the best option. 
Based on the Law "On consumer credit” The Bank of Russia quarterly calculates and 
publishes the average market value of the Full Cost of Credit (hereinafter FCC) by categories of 
consumer loans separately for all microfinance institutions, including microfinance organizations. 
According to the publication on 2nd quarter, the average FCC for consumer microloans without 
collateral, with an amount no more than 30 thousand rubles and for less than 30 days, is 615,064% 
and marginal FCC for the same period is 820,08532. For consumer microloans with collateral in 
the form of pledge, average FCC is 77,501%, marginal FCC is 103,335%.33  
Beside the FL №353 gives very detailed information and states requirement for consumer 
loan contract conditions such as the types of consumer loans, amounts and periods of loans, 
currency of loans, ways of lending including electronical means of payment, yearly interest rates, 
range of Full Cost of Consumer Credit, periodicity of repayment, and other kind of information 
on loan conditions. Regarding FCC requirement, microfinance organizations and traditional banks 
are obliged to expose the information about FCC on right upper angle of the first page in every 
consumer loan contract. The purpose of this requirement is to focus all consumers attention to the 
full cost of credit that they are going to borrow.  
Self-regulatory organizations of microfinance organizations in the first edition of Law No. 
151 were mentioned only twice - when approving the list of rights of the authorized body. SRO 
was granted the right to maintain a register of SRO MFIs and interact with them. 
In practice, this meant voluntary self-regulation and the right microfinance organizations 
to create self-regulating organizations within the framework of the general rules of Federal Law 
No. 315-FL of 01.12.2007 "On Self-Regulating Organizations" (hereinafter - Law No. 315-
FL).  
Adoption of mandatory rules and standards for members of SRO MFOs in conditions of 
voluntary membership in SRO MFOs hardly had a significant value in solving sector problems, 
since introduced requirements only for some of the participants in this financial market (Сhirkov 
2017). It seems that this approach cannot eliminate the problem of a decision that aims to introduce 
the relevant requirements of the rules and standards of SRO MFOs, and also creates regulatory 
arbitration (various regulation of the same activity). Probably, for this reason, many documents of 
                                                 
32 Average market values of the Full Cost of Consumer Credits (Loans) for the period from October 1 to 
December 31, 2017 - used for consumer credit (loan) contracts concluded in the II quarter of 2018 by microfinance 
organizations with individuals   
33 Ibid 
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the SRO of MFOs were quite controversial from the point of view of Law No. 315-FL, the nature 
of the recommendations.  
The insolvency of the idea of ensuring property liability of SRO MFOs for the obligations 
of their members is possible just illustrating with only two figures. As of 01.10.2015 the size of 
the compensation fund of the largest SRO MFO – SRO "Microfinance and development" (in 
Russian SRO “MIR”), which at that time combined 150 MFO-members, was 410 thousand rubles 
(Сhirkov 2017). Consequently, its size is not covered even half of one minimum possible 
obligation to one individual of one member of the SRO MFO. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that the system of voluntary self-regulation of the 
activities of microfinance organizations allowed to achieve the goals defined by Law No. 315-FL, 
was not effective from the point of view of ensuring the protection of consumer rights of services 
microfinance organizations and standardization of microfinance activities. Actually, existing 
SROs within the framework of Law No. 315-FL carried out the functions of professional 
associations and did not performed a role that in the literature prescribes self-regulating 
organizations as institutions of civil society. In addition, SROs were not under the supervision of 
the Bank of Russia, in fact there was no possibility of its influence on the SROs, which 
significantly reduced the potential functions of SROs. 
The situation in the field of self-regulation of the activities of microfinance organizations 
has changed in connection with the adoption and entry into force of the 11.01.2016 of the Law 
No. 223-FL on “self-regulated organizations of financial market”, according to which a 
microfinance organization is required to be a member of SRO only in the case of presence of a 
self-regulatory organization of the appropriate type.  
Internal standards of SROs in content and legal nature are similar to the "rules and 
standards" under Law No. 315-FL. The basic standards, which, by virtue of Article 5 of Law No. 
223-FL are mandatory for all microfinance organizations regardless their membership in the 
SROs, are presented in principle new in nature acts. Basic standards for their nature are not local 
acts, as standards of SROs are classified in the special literature and regulatory acts. They go 
beyond self-regulation, establishing requirements for MFOs that are not members of the SROs. 
According to the Law № 223, MFОs are obliged to join one of the Self-Regulated 
Organizations. By 16 February of current year overall 2124 MFОs are member of one of three 
SROs (MIR, EDINSTVO, ALIANCE)34.  
The law №223 states that the goals of self-regulated organizations are 1) the development 
of financial market, stability and efficiency of the industry, 2) Implementation of economic 
                                                 
34 https://www.cbr.ru/finmarket/supervision/sv_sro/ 
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initiatives of SROs’ members, 3) protection and representation of the interests of the members 
against Bank of Russia and other federal authorities.  
Also, the Law postulates the standards of self-regulated organizations, which are the 
documents that set requirements for the member of an SRO and regulatory relations between SRO 
members, and between SRO members and their clients as well. The Article №5 of the same law, 
clarifies the main requirements on Basic Standards that SROs should issue and agreed by Bank of 
Russia.  
According to another article of the same law, Bank of Russia in a writing form transfer its 
authority to SRO to gather the reports from its member in a defined period and way. The Law also 
states that microfinance organization could be a member of only one SRO, as well as other 
conditions and details how MFO should enter and leave an SRO. 
There are other laws that not directly relate to the regulation of the relationship between a 
creditor and a borrower, but the ones above are probably enough for any borrower to enhance its 
financial literacy in the microfinance segment and get qualified financial service. 
Regarding the main limitations that Bank of Russia set on microfinance organizations, 
include measures such as: (1) limitation on Full Cost of Consumer credit (the allowable excess of 
the "market average" by 1/3 for the corresponding category of the loan); (2) limitation on the size 
of charged fines and penalties (for violations of the performance of obligations under consumer 
loan agreements (no more than 20% per annum or 0.1% per day, depending on the accrual of 
interest); (3) a single limitation of the borrower's maximum debt under a consumer loan contract 
in relation to the amount of consumer loan in the amount of 2.5 times the amount of consumer 
credit; (4) a daily interest rate cap with the simultaneous limitation of the FCC. 
In February of current year, Bank of Russia made public its recent suggestions regarding 
future limitations directed to the development of the industry during fourth international 
microfinance conference on financial literacy and financial inclusion.35  
The main changes that were suggested by Bank of Russia are: 
• to establish a unified limitation of the borrower's maximum debt under a consumer 
loan contract in relation to the amount of the consumer loan (hereinafter referred to as the "Ratio") 
in the amount of 2.5 times the amount of the consumer loan, and also to prohibit the achievement 
of this coefficient on accrual and collection of interest for the use of consumer loan, penalties, 
fines, other payments and application of other measures of liability to the borrower.  
After introducing a 2.5x coefficient to continue further limiting the borrower's marginal 
debt continue to set up 2x coefficient from 01.07.2019, and 1,5x coefficient from 01.07.2020. 
                                                 
35 http://finfin.rmcenter.ru/#program 
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• to impose a daily interest rate cap of 1.5% per day, and from 01.07.2019 reducing 
the daily interest rate to 1.0% per day. 
• to introduce new specialized product (a loan without collateral, for a period not 
exceeding 15 days, for an amount not exceeding 10,000 rubles, with ban on prolongation and 
increase in the amount of consumer loan, and with fixed amount of payments: the amount of 
accrued interest for the use of consumer loan, penalties, fines, other measures of liability and 
payments not exceeding 3000 rubles for the issuance of a loan worth 10,000 rubles). 
 
3.4. The role of self-regulated organizations in microfinance industry regulation  
 
Currently, in microfinance industry one of the priorities for the state is to fight 
microfinance organizations that operate illegally. This task is relevant because such creditors do 
not contribute to the development of the microfinance market and discredit the activities of bona 
fide microfinance organizations. 
To implement the above task, the legislator has made some changes to the regulatory legal 
acts governing the activities of organizations that issue retail micro-loans. 
So, according to the provisions of the Federal Law № 223 "On self-regulated organizations 
in the financial market", all organizations operating in the financial markets should join self-
regulated organizations. Moreover, in accordance with the above-mentioned Law, "the obligation 
to join the SRO comes from the microfinance organization for 180 days following the day of the 
onset of one of the events: (1) the receipt by the non-profit organization of the status of a self-
regulatory organization of the appropriate type in the absence of a self-regulatory organization of 
the relevant type before the specified date; (2) termination of their membership in a self-regulatory 
organization". 
On March 10, 2016, the Central Bank included two SROs: the SRO Microfinance and 
Development (SRO MiR, Moscow) and SRO EDINSTVO (in Kazan) in the single register of 
self-regulated organizations in the financial market with respect to the type of activity of 
microfinance organizations. Accordingly, in order to implement the obligation stipulated by the 
Federal Law, by September 6, 2016, all MFOs were required to become members of one of the 
three registered SROs (apart from the two mentioned above, the Microfinance Alliance 
"Institutions for Small and Medium Business Development"), functioning in the microfinance 
industry. 
These SROs are entrusted, according to the provisions of the above-mentioned Law, with 
two main functions: primary control of MFOs and development of basic standards for their 
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activities. Hence, it follows that SROs conditionally performs the function of the mega-regulator 
(Bank of Russia), which certainly contributes to the effective work of all its participants 
(Semenova 2016). 
As for the Bank of Russia, it establishes requirements for basic standards, and oversees the 
proper implementation of SRO functions to monitor the activities of MFIOs. 
The self-regulatory organization should develop draft standards for the following types: 
(1) on risk management; (2) corporate governance; (3) internal control; (4) protection of the rights 
and interests of individuals and legal entities - recipients of financial services provided by members 
of self-regulatory organizations; (5) transactions in the financial market. 
These basic standards developed by each self-regulating organization uniting MFOs, once 
agreed by the standards committee under the Bank of Russia, will be mandatory for all MFOs, 
regardless of their membership in a particular SRO. 
The fact that an SRO has the right to make any proposals to the Central Bank, as well as 
to develop work standards, positively affects the lives of both lenders and borrowers, and also 
contributes to the overall development of the financial services market. 
The entry of microfinance organizations into the SRO more likely will have a positive 
impact on their activities, since all microfinance organizations that have membership in SROs 
have certain advantages and provide additional guarantees for borrowers' rights, which 
significantly increases the demand for their loans from consumers. 
First, such organizations can easily place their advertising, while other organizations 
cannot always take advantage of such a right, which negatively affects their lending volumes. 
Secondly, borrowers have more confidence in MFOs, who are members of SROs, because they 
are not afraid of fraud. And, thirdly, since today there are cases of bad faith of creditors who carry 
out their activities illegally, it is only by participation in a self-regulating organization that a 
creditor can prove his conscientiousness towards the consumer. 
In the context of this research, we will stick to SRO MiR while analyzing the main 
functions of SROs as well as the standards they issue. 
Regarding the foundation of SRO MiR, we should briefly describe the main steps of 
transformation SRO MiR after the Law on microfinance organizations was issued in 2010. So, 
with the purpose of assisting members of the partnership to carry out activities in the field of 
microfinance and completely supporting the formation and integrated development of 
microfinance organizations, in 2011 Non-commercial partnership of microfinance organizations 
"Microfinance and Development" (NP "MIR") was created by the largest participants of the 
microfinance market. 
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To fulfil its goals, the partnership planned to promote the development of legislation in the 
field of microfinance and the legal regulation of MFO activities, to develop and implement 
standards for microfinance activity, to monitor and survey MFOs, to provide organizational, 
informational, analytical, methodological, legal and other assistance to the members of the 
partnership, to expand contacts between MFOs and MFO specialists, to form a favorable public 
opinion on microfinance activities, etc.36 
Later, NP “MIR” transferred its functions to NP “Union of MIR”, which in its turn was 
merged into newly created SRO “MIR” after April 2014. 
It should be stated, however, that before the law “On self-regulated organizations in 
microfinance market” came to existence, the membership in NP “MIR” and later in NP “Union of 
MIR” was implemented on voluntary basis, while a membership to SRO “MIR” is mandatory 
according to the law from 2015. Accordingly, the relationship between SRO and its members is 
driven by high mutual interests for cooperation and integration, since the majority of the members 
joined SRO before all microfinance organizations were forced by the law to join on of SROs. 
Currently, SRO “MIR” actively engaged in such tasks as37:  
- Assistance in resolving issues arising from interaction with regulatory body  
- Assistance in bringing internal documentation into line with the requirements of 
regulatory legal acts 
- Legal support in the course of inspections 
- Developing and implementing business standards in practice  
- Protecting consumers' rights in the microfinance market, including involving a 
financial ombudsman to resolve disputes 
- Participation in the development of regulations affecting the interests of SRO 
members.  
- Work with the media, including the Internet 
- Publication of materials of SRO members in the profile journal "Microfinance +" 
and on the portal rusmicrofinance.ru 
-  Work with complaints from clients of MFIs, including with the involvement of the 
financial ombudsman.  
The leadership of SRO "MIR" states that one of the most important goals of SRO is to 
create and strengthen a positive image of MFOs (primarily SRO members) in the eyes of potential 
clients, as well as in the eyes of governmental officials. 
                                                 
36 http://npmir.ru/about/np-mir/ 
37 http://npmir.ru/about/sro-mir/index.php 
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 Regarding the second main function of SROs - development of basic standards for 
microfinance activities – SRO MiR was engaged in the process of standard development with 
Bank of Russian and other partners since its funding.  
So, in 2013, in association with “National Association of Professional Collection 
Agencies” (NAPKA), NP “MIR” worked out and published “The code of ethics and standards 
of work with long-term debt on microfinance market of organizations”. 
The Code of Ethical Standards establishes and defines the basic principles by which MFOs 
and professional collection agencies should be guided in their professional activities to claim debt 
on loans granted. These principles are based on the norms of legislation, morality, as well as 
international standards of collection activities and business practices in the microfinance sector38. 
As stated in the Code, the provisions of this Code carry a recommendatory and not 
mandatory character for MFIs - members of NP "MIR" and for Agency members of the NGO 
"NAPKA", working in the field of collection of overdue debts under contracts with MFOs.  
The next step in standard development was the issue of standards for “Cessional 
transactions in microfinance market” in 2014. These Standards have been developed and 
approved in order to establish common professional and ethical rules of transactions on the 
assignment of claims under micro-loan agreements on the microfinance market, taking into 
account interests, as parties under the Assignment Agreement, and debtors-borrowers of MFIs, 
whose observance promotes the civilized development of the microfinance market (Standard 
2014). 
Standards for “Cessional transactions” were designed to ensure: (1) creation of transparent 
conditions for the tendering procedure for the selection of buyers for MFOs; (2) determination of 
the basic rights and obligations of the parties under the Assignment Agreement at the stage of its 
conclusion and execution; (3) systematization of provisions that take into account the interests of 
both MFIs and buyers on cession contracts; (4) coordination of the main issues arising in 
concluding cession agreements, in particular, the establishment of their standard conditions; (5) 
the procedure for determining the fair price under the Assignment Agreement; (6) avoidance of 
possible risks in the evaluation of assignments portfolios; (7) achievement of the most effective 
recovery in the framework of the Assignment Agreements. 
On 22 June of 2017, the Bank of Russia approved Basic Standard on “protection of the 
rights and interests of individuals and legal entities - recipients of financial services rendered 
by members of self-regulating organizations in the financial market that unite microfinance 
organizations” (Standard 2017).  
                                                 
38 https://www.cbr.ru/finmarket/supervision/sv_sro/ 
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This Standard was adopted to: (1) ensuring compliance with the rights and legitimate 
interests of recipients of financial services provided by microfinance organizations; (2) preventing 
unscrupulous practices of interaction between microfinance organizations and recipients of 
financial services; (3) increasing the information openness of the microfinance market in the 
Russian Federation, as well as raising the level of financial literacy and awareness of financial 
service recipients about the activities of microfinance organizations; (4) improving the quality of 
financial services provided by microfinance organizations, as well as creating the conditions for 
effective control by self-regulating organizations in the financial market of the activities of 
microfinance organizations. 
The standard is based on the norms of the legislation of the Russian Federation and is 
mandatory for use by microfinance organizations, regardless of their membership in a self-
regulatory organization and acts in a part that does not contradict the legislation of the Russian 
Federation, including regulatory acts of the Bank of Russia. A microfinance organization must 
include in the agreement with a third person acting on behalf of, on behalf and at the expense of 
such a microfinance organization, provisions that oblige such third party to comply with the 
requirements of this Standard. 
Finally, on 27 April of current year, Basic Standard on “the performance of operations 
by microfinance organizations in financial market” (Standard 2018). 
The Standard establishes the conditions and procedure for the following transactions in the 
financial market subject to standardization in respect of microfinance organizations: (1) issuance 
of microloans; (2) attraction of funds from individuals.  
The standard is mandatory for all microfinance organizations, regardless of membership 
in a self-regulatory organization in the financial market that unites microfinance organizations and 
operates in a part that does not contradict the legislation of the Russian Federation and regulatory 
acts of the Bank of Russia. The standard sets the main conditions for the implementation of 
operations regarding microlending, attraction of funds from private customers as well as the order 
of implementation of microlending operations and attraction of funds, procedures for the 
evaluation of client creditworthiness.   
 
Summary 
 
As we have seen, microfinance in Russia takes its roots from Tsarist Russian period, then 
transformed during Soviet Union 70 years, after which started new era of its development since 
1990s. The main law on microfinance organizations was issued later in 2010, when the industry 
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had already matured and well-established. Currently, there are more than 2000 microfinance 
organizations with credit portfolio of almost 113 bln rubles.      
The major problems, that still exist in MFO market and especially in PDL segment, 
include: low level of financial literacy of consumers, invasive marketing strategy by many MFOs, 
non-purposeful borrowing, lack of transparency by many MFOs, still high interest rates and fines, 
lack of alternative sources of financing for many citizens, still lack of control on discloser of credit 
conditions by MFOs and “Mission Shift” from some MFOs. 
The industry is regulated according to several state laws such as Law “On Microfinance 
Activities and Microfinance Organizations”, Law “On consumer credit”, Law “On self-regulated 
organizations of financial market”, as well as number of normative acts and several limitations by 
Bank of Russia.  
Regarding the self-regulation of the industry, SROs have two main functions: primary 
control of MFOs and development of basic standards for their activities. As stated by SRO MiR, 
one of the most important goals of SRO is to create and strengthen a positive image of MFOs 
(primarily SRO members) in the eyes of potential clients, as well as in the eyes of governmental 
officials.   
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology 
In this chapter we will describe the methodology applied for current research. In section 
4.1 will be discussed the used research philosophy as well as the research design stating why the 
chosen research design is most applicable to current study and what are the research questions. 
Then, in section 4.2 we will try to prove why the certain sampling strategy was chosen for this 
research. Finally, in section 4.3 we will describe in detail the main steps of data collection and 
procedures.    
4.1. Research philosophy, approach and design 
    
  The five major research philosophies are positivism, critical realism, interpretivism, 
postmodernism and pragmatism (Saunders et al.2016). The more appropriate research philosophy 
for the current research is pragmatism. This philosophy fits to his research context not only because 
there is not a single philosophy for this context, but also that Pragmatism assumes that the research 
starts from the problem and intends to find practical solutions (Saunders et al. 2016). As we have 
real research problem, which requires explorative investigation with the aim of finding solutions, 
we can state that Pragmatism suits this idea in the best way. 
Regarding the research approach for current study, the abductive was chosen as more 
descriptive.  The difficulty to decide whether this study close more to deductive or to inductive 
approaches, makes us to adhere to abductive approach, which allows us to maneuver   from general 
theory of self-regulation to practical implication of the theory in microfinance industry and vice 
versa. Additionally, the goal of this study is not to test hypothesis, and the study itself carries 
highly explorative design, the circumstances that almost exclude the applicability of deductive 
approach (Saunders et al. 2016).  
Additionally, inductive approach is also not favorable for this research, since the concept 
of self-regulation is widely discussed in the literature and investigated by number of scholars. 
Likewise, the opportunity of modifying the existing theory and models another reason that 
abduction is relevant to our research, since our study intends to find new approaches to more 
effective self-regulation of microfinance industry. Finally, abductive approach is free of 
constraints that have deductive and inductive methods. Hence, the most convenient approach for 
this study is abductive method. 
To achieve the main goal of the current research, we have developed the following research 
questions: 
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• RQ1 - What are the most relevant ethical issues of Russian microfinance 
organizations which may require regulation? 
• RQ2 – What should be an effective approach to self-regulation of the industry to 
prevent unethical behavior of MFOs? 
The stated research questions obviously show the explorative purpose of research design. 
This type of design is applied usually when the researcher aims to understand nature of 
phenomenon and gain deep insights about the research problem.  
As our study aims to find out solutions and effective approaches to the self-regulation of 
microfinance organizations, exploratory strategy would allow us to investigate the field deeper 
and to answer the questions of what, why, how types. 
 Another reason, that such research strategy fits our study is the fact that the concept of 
effective self-regulation in microfinance is poorly defined and explored yet. Also, an explorative 
research strategy is useful for collecting preliminary information in cases when researchers luck 
verified information in order to set conceptual distinctions or state explanatory relationships 
(Shields, 2013).  
Finally, exploratory research usually starts with a wide focus, but then becomes narrower as 
the research develops (Saunders et al. 2016). In case of our research, we had a very broad problem 
as starting point, which requires further investigation. After, we tried to narrow the scope of 
research to be able to give more thorough and comprehensive answers to the research questions. 
The research design chosen for the current study is multi-method qualitative study. There 
are several reasons why qualitive research design more than other designs correspond to this 
research.  
The first reason is the explorative nature of the design already discussed above. As we aim 
to find more insight on the research problem, qualitative research will allow us to explore the 
possibility of developing conceptual framework for more effective self-regulation of microfinance 
organizations.  
Also, qualitative method will allow us to be more flexible in gathering information from 
participants of microfinance industry. Another reason for choosing qualitative research method is 
the very sensitive nature of the problem (Malhotra et al. 2012). In our research we want to answer 
such question as what kind of ethical practices exist in the industry and how these practices relate 
to the self-regulation of MFOs. All these issues are very sensitive and require qualitative technics 
to get meaningful and trustworthy answers.  
Finally, for the explorative research strategy qualitative methods could bring to 
unanticipated meaningful insights that could not be achieved through quantitative research tools.   
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      Figure 3: Research design39 
 
4.2. Sample strategy 
 
Choosing a study sample is one of the most important steps in any research project since it 
is hardly practical, efficient or ethical to study whole populations (Marshal M. 1996). Generally, 
the aim of all quantitative sampling methods is to draw a representative sample from the 
population, in a way that the results might be used to generalize it to the population.  
The choice of an appropriate method directly relates to the research goal and strategy. 
Although different scholars specify various classifications of sampling methods, but most of them 
agree that there are three main sampling methods. 
• Purposeful Sampling is the most common sampling strategy. With this type of 
sampling, researchers based on research question, choose participants based on pre-selected 
principles. The sample size might be chosen predeterminable or based on theoretical saturation 
technique, which is the point after which a new participant does not provide new insights to the 
research. 
• Quota Sampling is a sampling technique when researcher has predetermined 
number of quotas regarding the number of participants prior to sampling. In these cases, 
researchers are inclined to gather data from a determined number of participants corresponding to 
certain characteristics such as age, sex, class, marital status, etc. (Berg and Lune, 2005). 
                                                 
39 Source by author 
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• Snowball Sampling, which is as called also chain referral sampling, the 
participants help the researcher referring them to other participants who may be potential target 
group for the study.  Moreover, this sampling offers researchers assistance in recruitment of new 
participants that are hard to reach otherwise.  
For current research we have chosen purposeful sampling method, as the research problem 
requires to include in the research process the participants from all interested parties. In this case, 
these interest sides include representatives of SRO MiR, Russian Microfinance Center, 
Microfinance organizations. As wrong sampling method could bring to the problem of poor 
representativeness of the entire population, we included not only the representatives of all interest 
sides, but also distinguished the participants according to their representativeness, influence in 
appropriate fields, position, size, the attitude and interest toward the research problem.   
One type of the purposeful sampling method is maximum variation sampling, also known 
as heterogeneous sampling. As obviously shows the name of this sampling type, it is a technique 
used to capture a wide range of perspectives relating to the research problem. Also, maximum 
variation sampling helps researchers to seek for variation in opinions and conditions that are 
viewed as more extreme in their nature to the researcher. The basic principle of maximum 
variation sampling is to gain greater insights into a phenomenon by observing it from all 
perspectives.  
All these factors made us to choose maximum variation sampling method as the more 
suitable and relevant for our research strategy. 
After choosing a right research sampling method, researchers should determine the optimal 
sample size which will allow them to enable valid inferences and generalization about the 
population. From one side, the larger is the sample size, the smaller is the chance of a sampling 
error, but from the other side, very large sample does not mean that the sampling error will 
decrease proportionally. The reason is that the sampling error is inversely proportional to the 
square root of the sample size. 
For this research we adhered to the sample saturation point technique for interview part of 
our research, since the latter carries high explorative nature.  
4.3. Data collection methods and procedures 
 
In current study, different methods will be used to answer research questions which will 
allow to increase the validity of the results. This approach is known as triangulation in literature.  
The main advantages of triangulation approach include increasing confidence in research data, 
revealing exclusive findings, challenging or integrating theories, and providing a clearer 
understanding of the problem” (Thurmond, 2001, p. 254).  
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Therefore, we will use two research instruments to achieve research goal and to answer 
research questions: (1) Semi-structured interviews and (2) Online Survey. 
The preliminary part of the research is presented in the form of semi-structured interviews, 
which will allow us to come up with relatively small but purposeful sample from interest sides 
including: Russian Microfinance Association’s representatives, Self-Regulated organization’s 
representatives and microfinance organizations’ representatives.  
Semi-structured interviews will allow us to get more insights about the industry and 
research problem and help to clarify the relevant aspects for the survey as well. 
In this stage to obtain more rich-data information which will help us to partly answer 
research questions and to create more comprehensive survey. The executive level managers were 
targeted as potential interviewees. It is of high importance that selected respondents could provide 
the concrete personal examples or opinions about the issues existing in the industry and their 
personal point of view toward the more effective approaches to self-regulation of microfinance 
organizations in Russia. 
The interviews will be taken both face-to-face and online (by skype). Specific semi-
structured questions on the research problem will be asked to representatives of SRO MiR, RMC, 
based on the specific positioning of these institutions. Microfinance organizations’ representatives 
will be asked about the field issues and their activities in form of more explorative semi-structured 
questions. 
              Table 2: Interview timetable 
Name Company Position 
Interview 
tool 
First 
Interview 
date & time 
Second 
Interview 
date & time 
Yelena 
Strateva 
SRO MiR, 
RMC 
Director, 
Deputy 
director 
By Skype 
28.02.2018 
12:00-12:45 
17.03.2018 
19:00-20:05 
Andrey 
Paranich 
SRO MiR  
Deputy 
director 
Face-to-Face 
22.03.2018 
17:00-17:50 
 
Andrey 
Kuznetsov 
Profi Credit   Director Face-to-Face 
04.04.2018 
11:00-12:30 
 
Pavel 
Sologub 
Do Zarplati   Director Face-to-Face 
18.04.2018 
13:00-14:00 
 
Alexandr 
Shustov 
Money Fanny Director By Skype 
18.04.2018 
15:00-16:00 
 
Irina 
Khoroshko 
MoneyMen Director By skype 
19.04.2018 
12:00-13:00 
 
 73 
We can characterize all conducted interviews as being in-depth and exhaustive. Although, 
there were some structured questions for all participants, however, these questions were 
formulated mostly to navigate the researchers, rather to hamper the flexibility and thoroughness 
of the interview. 
Interview questions were structured in a way to obtain thorough understanding and 
examples of unethical practices existing in Russian microfinance industry. The questions were 
also directed to get participants’ attitude and rational judgment toward the regulation of the 
industry, and how self-regulated organizations could develop more effective approaches to 
prevent the industry participants from unethical lending practices. 
Actually, there are two target groups for interviews: representatives of self-regulated 
organizations in person of director and deputy director of SRO MiR, and microfinance 
organizations that are members of SRO MiR. 
Semi-structured interviews with representatives of SRO MiR cover 5 main blocks of 
questions: 
1. Questions related to the development and history of microfinance institutions in 
Russia, 
2. Questions related to the creation and goal of such associations as RMC, NAUMIR 
and SROs in microfinance, 
3. Questions related to how these institutions were trying to regulate the activities 
of microfinance institutions from 1990s and how they were preventing the unscrupulous 
practices existing in the industry,  
4. Questions related to the achievements of SRO MiR implementing its goals and 
mission,  
5. Questions related to how the government regulates the industry and how this 
regulation affects the sustainability of microfinance organizations. 
 
Interviews with representatives of microfinance organizations cover 6 main blocks of 
questions: 
1. Questions related to company’s history, business model and strategy, 
2. Questions related to how companies understand the ethics of the relationship with 
clients,  
3. Questions related to the unethical behavior of participants that exist in the 
industry, 
4. Questions related to how companies train and supervise their managers to avoid 
unethical behavior, 
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5. Questions related to whether SRO MiR implements its duties effectively and 
assists companies in conducting more responsible and ethical microlending, 
6. Questions related to whether the regulation of the industry by Bank of Russia is 
beneficial for both MFOs and customers.  
All interviews were recorded, and the transcripts were compiled based on detailed 
description of all parts of the interviews. Then, the transcripts constituted the data for the study. 
The saturation point was reached after sixth interview, when answers to the main questions started 
to repeat.   
The second stage of data collection process is the creation and conduct of online 
questionnaire among the representatives of microfinance organizations. The survey will be 
distributed via e-mails or through direct contacting with the help of SRO MiR as an intermediary.  
The target respondents for the survey was comprised to high level management including 
only directors, deputy directors and head of departments. The justification of such strict targeting 
strategy is the fact that questions included in the survey are mostly in the scope of high 
management responsibilities, and only people who are responsible for the governance of 
companies, could give responses to the questions asked in the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire consists of 5 main blocks and includes both open-ended and closed-
ended questions/ 
• The first block of questionnaire is demography part, which includes questions about 
the type, segment, credit portfolio size of the companies, and the positions of respondents as well, 
• The second block includes questions regarding the determination of microloans’ 
conditions and about ethical perceptions of interest rates by respondents. The block includes also 
questions about ethical evaluation of penalty types and sizes on overdue microloans, about extra 
expenses that MFIs charge aside the main loan amount and interest rate, and finally, questions on 
the average size of marginal indebtedness of customers in each company’s portfolio. 
• The third block comprises questions referring to the conditions of microloans by 
MFIs. In this block respondents are asked about all conditions and requirements that MFIs set on 
potential borrowers, in other words, this block includes questions such as the average approval 
rate of loans in each company, and how MFIs keep contact with their clients. There are also 
questions on the relevance of factors that might bring to unethical practices, on distinguishing the 
common types of unethical behavior demonstrations in the industry from service providers side, 
and how MFIs train and compensate their managers responsible for microlending to customers. 
• The fourth block relates to the activities of SROs, and how effectively these 
associations implement their functions.  
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• The fifth block relates to the justification of the policy run by Bank of Russia toward 
the industry. In this block, very thorough and specific questions are asked to the respondents such 
as effectiveness of separate limitations regarding daily interest rates, marginal indebtedness, fines 
and marginal full cost of credits that the regulator impose on MFIs. There are questions that are 
directed to the evaluation of the attitude of MFIs toward policy of the regulator.  
Overall, the questionnaire consists of 32 questions, 5 open-ended and 27 closed-ended 
questions. Almost all multiple questions offer variety of choices for each separate question that 
maximally covers the all viable options. From 27 closed-ended questions, 6 questions offer an 
open-text option to respondents, which will allow us to gather new ideas and insights about the 
concrete topics.   
The final number of respondents is 40, from which 7 are from MFC, and 33 are from МСС. 
Such kind of distribution is a good representation of real relation between number of two types of 
microfinance organizations (as of 01.01.2018 there are 60 MFC and 2211 MCC). 
 
Summary 
As we have seen, the more appropriate research philosophy for the current research is 
pragmatism since the current research starts from the real problem and intends to find practical 
solutions. Regarding research approach, abductive was chosen as it allows us to maneuver   from 
general theory of self-regulation to practical implication of the theory in microfinance industry 
and vice versa.  
The stated research questions obviously show the explorative purpose of research design. 
Regarding the research design, multi-method qualitative study was.  
For the research we have chosen purposeful sampling method, as the research problem 
requires to include in research process the participants from all interest parties. As subtype one of 
purposeful sampling method maximum variation was chosen that allows us to capture a wide range 
of perspectives relating to the research problem. 
To achieve the research goal and to answer the research questions two main research 
instruments were chosen - semi-structured interviews and online survey. 
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Chapter 5. Data analysis and discussions 
In this chapter we will analyze the data and make conclusions. Particularly, in section 5.1 
the data gathered from in-depth interviews and online survey will be analyzed thoroughly and 
main findings will be stressed. In section, 5.2 we will discuss the main findings and give explicit 
answers to research questions. Then theoretical and managerial implications of current research 
will be stated in section 5.3. Finally, in section 5.4 the main limitations of current research will be 
discussed, and future research topics will be suggested.  
 
5.1. Data processing and analysis 
 
As noted above, two research tools (semi-structured interviews and online survey) were 
chosen for current study that will help us answer to research questions and make valid conclusions 
on research several topics related to research problem.  
Interview analysis 
As interview analysis generally refers to qualitative data analysis, we considered all 
appropriate data analysis techniques and chose ones that will allow us to analyze the data 
maximum effectively.  
One of such technique is the use of computer packages, which is recommended mostly in 
case of high numbers of interview data (more than 40 interviews) (Adams et al., 2007). Since the 
data we collected during interviews in this research is not large in volumes, we will not use 
computer packages, rather will manage the data manually. The next widely used technique for 
interview data investigation is thematic analysis, which allow to categorize and quantify data with 
the aim of making more generable findings. However, as we do not have homogenous structure of 
respondents in our sample (some respondents represent SROs and RMC, while the others are 
representatives of MFOs), we will not use thematic analysis as well. Instead we will apply two 
traditional manual techniques to analyze the date extracted from transcripts of conducted 
interviews.   
The first tool that will be used is “quote-research” technique, which means the use of quotes 
from interview as descriptive or approving examples (Folkestad, 2008). We will use this technique 
for presenting the main ideas of interviewees on current ethical issues and practices of MFOs, how 
MFOs understand ethics with clients, and how MFOs trains employees to ethical behavior and 
obedience to ethical standards. Also, quoting techniques will allow us to present and analyze the 
SROs and MFOs leaderships’ attitude and position toward self-regulation of the industry, and the 
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actions that SROs implement to prevent unethical behavior of participants. Finally, quoting 
technique will help us to analyze the opinions of interviewees toward the current regulation by 
Bank of Russia, after which we would analyze the potential for more effective self-regulation 
approaches for the industry. We will quote interviewees’ as experts’ opinions (expert A, expert B, 
etc.), in this way keeping the anonymous and impersonal interpretation of the results of interviews. 
As the second technique we will use cross-interview analysis mainly for comparative 
purposes. This technique will help us to augment generalizability of the results. Particularly, we 
will use cross analysis to identify the main ethical issues present in current microfinance 
organizations that need regulation. Also, cross-checking of answers by interviewees will be used 
to come with more effective approaches to self-regulation of the industry extracted from the 
answers of interviewees. Additionally, this technique will be used to compare interviewees’ 
opinions on different issues and concerns related both to the industry regulation and MFOs 
sustainability. 
At the beginning of the interviews, the industry participants were asked to describe briefly 
their companies and entities they are working, the history and major development steps of their 
companies. The purpose of such questions was to get acquainted with the companies, and to have 
some general picture about segments, portfolio size, and organizational type of these 
organizations. As this kind of information carries highly descriptive nature, and high importance 
for our analysis, we will not discuss the answers of interviewees regarding their companies’ 
overviews. 
The next bundle of questions that were asked to experts and are of high importance for 
current research, relate to main ethical issues that present in microfinance industry, how 
participants understand ethics and implement in their business, what are the main ethical issues 
that require attention and regulation. We should state, that the answers of interviewees do not differ 
in most important topics.  
As mentioned by one of the experts, ethical issues exist in microfinance industry from very 
beginning since 1990s and still exist: “Surely, ethical problems existed already that period when 
there was no regulation, moreover, this kind of practices exist even now but without regulation the 
number of such would have been higher” (expert A). Another expert states that during 1990s when 
the industry was just making first steps of development, and there was luck of experience, MFOs 
hired personal from banking sphere with the aim of boosting microlending, however such 
approach did not work: “the traditional banking financier was not applicable for this new business, 
as the customer base is different. Clients of banks differ greatly that’s of MFO” (expert B). The 
same expert adds that one of the reasons for unethical practices of that period is that fact that that 
many non-professionals entered to the industry trying to earn good margins for short time. The 
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industry was very attractive for such people, who having some capital decided to invest in a field 
where the demand was extra high. But after the industry started to be organized and developed, 
these non-professionals faced huge problems: “interestingly, while the market was wild and not 
organized these people succeeded, but we can say that now this wave almost passed, and the 
regular regulation of the market force these people leave the industry. Very soon these non-
professionals understand that the profit margin is not as high as they expected” (expert B). 
Before asking experts about ethical issues that exist in the industry, we tried to get answers 
how they understand ethics with clients. It is very important to be sure that interviewees understand 
and have their perception of what is ethical behavior, what is morality, and how unethical behavior 
could harm clients.  
Some experts stated that they have developed standards and principles in their companies 
that help them behave in more ethical manner in their interactions: “Long before the basic 
standards were issued, we had a very deep understanding of ethics in our relations with clients, we 
completely understand who our clients are, and our task is to help them make rational and 
deliberate decisions” (expert C). Another expert understands the ethics of MFO with it clients as 
a mutually beneficial deal: “The most important thing is that the interaction or deal between MFO 
and client should be mutually beneficial” (expert F). 
The main unethical practices of early MFOs relate mostly to several major topics such as 
collection, high interest rates, high penalties and extra expenses for clients, luck of transparency 
on loan conditions, lack of training of personnel to ethical standards, using market power by MFO, 
irresponsible lending my MFOs etc.  
1) Not surprising is the fact that the most discussed unethical practices that MFOs are 
abused for, are unscrupulous collection. All experts agree that the key issues from very 1990s were 
related to unethical behavior of MFOs or collection agencies toward clients, the circumstance that 
darkened the image of the whole industry both in media and minds of numbers of people: “Yes, 
in microfinance, the ethics mostly connected with the overdue loans and collection practices. The 
ethical issues were always subject of attention by all interest sides” (expert A). However, here we 
should mention that not all MFOs are collecting overdue loans by themselves. There are number 
of MFOs that outsource this service to collection agencies, and this circumstance makes difficult 
to understand that who is responsible for unethical practices that might be used to return the 
overdue loans – MFOs or collection companies? As expert B states “it is not clear who is darkening 
the image of the industry, since MFOs can collect the debt themselves or outsource it to collector 
companies. In most cases MFOs do not give small loans to collectors, as the latter are reluctant to 
take it due to lesser amounts”. 
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In current situation as well, all experts agree that collection still remains one of the 
problematic areas of the industry. As one of the experts noticed “many MFOs have special 
employees for overdue debts and collection, who sometimes collect payments in unethical manner 
and ways” (expert E). This means that not all MFOs solved this problem, regardless standards and 
other legislative and normative acts were enacted to regulate such behavior. Moreover, unethical 
and unscrupulous collection practices are taken place when anti-renting system of SROs exist and 
MFOs might be included in these lists. 
The second ethical problem related MFOs activities is the issue of exploitative interest 
rates, that usually society define as “usury interest rates”. However, before making our judgments 
it is wise to listen how participants of the industry perceive this problem, whether they agree that 
the problem of high interest rates exist or not, and if exist to understand what the reasons and 
motivations of such behavior are.  
What is important here, to take into account that interest rate is formed in a typical MFO 
from different components operational and maintenance expenses, allocations to reserves for 
overdue loans set by Bank of Russia, as well as cost of funding and profit margin that MFOs set 
to achieve. In contrast to banks, MFOs that lend microloans of small amounts for very short periods 
(for example 10,000-15,000 rubles for 15 days). This means the operational expenses are 
dramatically high. Also, reserve allocations are high due to high level of non-return in 
microfinance industry. Funding of MFOs is also high, and only MFC could admit deposits from 
private investors. “We should take into account, that with small loans the operational expenses are 
high enough, which increases overall cost of services, force companies to charge high interest rates 
to cover costs and have some minimum margin” (expert E). In contrast to banks, MFOs pay more 
for investment which also increase interest rate objectively. Another expert states the same idea 
giving more details: “The main reason is that expenses for paper, office, requests to credit bureau, 
personnel and other operational expenses are very high related to small amount of microloan. 
Additionally, the loans are given for very short period, and MFO should cover all these costs 
related to the very loan in the same short period” (expert B). 
Regarding the comparisons of banking interest rates and ones that MFOs charge is of high 
interest for experts. Both brought the same example to show how this comparison is out of logic 
and how people perceive interest rates set by banks and MFOs: “I want to say that this comparison 
is not a wise decision. We can take the example of apartment and hotel. When you pay for rented 
apartment is analogous to banking rates, and the payment for hotel is analogous to MFOs’ interest 
rates. When you are renting a hotel for two days, and estimates the annual payment with this rate, 
it would be tremendously big amount. But in a short time, it is not critical, and you can afford 
yourself to pay this money” (expert C, expert D). Another expert also points out that interest rate 
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should cover expenses and future investments for company development, as well of some profit 
margin to provide its sustainability: “MFOs have costs and margin for profit and each of them 
decides what should be the size of margin, that will cover future investments and bring some 
profit” (expert E). 
Talking about what is the ethical level of interest rate, experts have different opinions and 
some difficulties to point concrete figures. “I think 3% is the limit, higher interest rate than this 
level is unethical” expert F points out, while another expert mentions another level as being ethical: 
“I think that 1% is ethical, since in European countries this level is average, and Russian MFOs 
almost came to this level themselves” (expert E). According to another expert (D) 2-3% per day 
might be considered ethical. Here, again we should clarify that MFOs that operate only in PDL 
segment, consider 1,5% and more interest rate as ethical, while MFOs that operate in installment 
loans segment, can afford to charge lower interest rates. Therefore, experts’ judgments toward 
ethical level of interest rate are a little bit ambiguous, and we cannot figure out concrete level from 
interview data.  
Another problem that MFOs are accused for is high penalties and extra expenses they 
charge from clients. Experts agree that current regulation mostly solved this issue, and Bank of 
Russia set the maximum size of the penalties MFOs could charge. However, even today some 
MFOs have such practices: “We have another interesting moment, before current regulation, when 
a client might forget to repay its loan, some MFOs taking advantage of this situation do not inform 
clients before the loan turns to overdue and later charge extra high fines.  A loan of 10,000 rubles 
is very soon becomes 150,000 rubles due to 5% fine on overdue loan. Interestingly, from the court 
perspective, it’s normal as there is a contract and MFO are right to charge penalties” (expert B). 
Another expert also states that such practices reached to minimum under current regulation: “In 
the past, there were such practices in the industry, when MFOs drove clients to debt funnel and 
then charged extra excessive amounts in comparison what they borrowed” (expert E). The same 
expert goes further and shares with another value observation “such schemes are not possible for 
MFOs operating in legal market, but it is beneficial for “grey” participants who wants that clients 
go default in order they could charge more money from”. Regarding fines and accumulation of 
huge debt for overdue loans, expert C thinks that one of the main reasons why PDL segment is 
more vulnerable for unethical practices is accumulation of huge fines and penalties: “I can just 
state my opinion that this negative attitude toward PDL segment comes from the fact of endless 
increase of the debt” (experts C). Finally, one of the experts just state that completely agree with 
current regulation on fine accumulation: “I don’t think that now there are high fines, it is regulated 
in proper way and these concerns related only to the past” (expert D). 
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One of the most common ethical issues is luck of transparency on loan conditions, which 
some MFOs could demonstrate in their interaction with clients. Moreover, luck of transparency 
might not only demonstrated in disclose of full information, but also not referring clients options 
of prolongations and restructuring: “One off the main ethical issues that might be seen in some 
cases is the hidden information about loan conditions, size of penalties for overdue loans, extra 
payments such as insurance, . The problem is that MFOs inform about these payments, but not 
consult clients about loan conditions. What is important, that MFO should help clients in case of 
difficulties and offer options that will help them to manage with the situations” (expert D).  
Another expert thinks that the problem of transparency and luck of full information on loan 
conditions are issue not only for MFOs but also for banks’ clients: “Transparency on conditions, 
but maybe this problem exist not only in MFOs but banks as well” (expert F). 
Analyzing responses of experts regarding main ethical issues and unscrupulous practices, 
we should pay attention to one important indicator, which MFOs brought as a justification that 
they highly value their clients and each client is very important for their company. This indicator 
is client return rate, which is high in all companies our interviewees represent: “We are highly 
motivated serve client with high quality in order to make him come back to our office. The return 
rate is very high in our company, more that 70%” (expert D). Another expert also mentions about 
high return rate as a good indicator for client valuation: “Return rate of clients is very high (more 
than 80%), which shows how we value every client” (expert E).      
2) Next important topic discussed with all interviewees relates to potential reasons of 
unethical behavior and the motivations that bring to unethical practices in the industry. 
Although answers of experts differ, but one common patter can be distinguished in all 
answers. The main reason of unethical behavior or unscrupulous practices takes it roots in people’s 
education and moral perception about good and bad. Saying people, we first refer to owners and 
heads of the company, and also ordinary employees. People who luck morality, family education 
can behave unethically: “Such people are very jealous and want to gain maximum from the market, 
from each client” (expert D). Another expert also states the same idea “Why some people are 
arrogant, while the others are ethical and conscientious? Because the latter like their job, want to 
do it well, and leave some track after their life. But there are people who are eager to exploit others 
and earn maximum from given chance” (expert E). 
Another reason that supposed to bring unethical practices is luck of competition, when 
clients do not have ability to make comparisons, agree to the conditions offered by MFOs. 
Sometimes, MFOs could take advantage of this situation, and charge high interest rates or do not 
offer loan prolongations and restructuring to clients, which is not honest toward people that are in 
dire situation due to some objective or subjective reasons: “Especially in many regions, if there 
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are few alternatives or not at all, clients have no choice and cannot choose MFO with lower interest 
rates or make comparisons” (expert B).   However, other experts are suspicious little bit about this 
thesis, and think that the competition is high in the industry: “Nobody wants to increase interest 
rates taking advantage from this situation. The opposite is true, interest rates always tend to go 
down. A few years ago, interest rates started to decrease from 3% to gradually to current level of 
2 %” (expert D). Another expert believes that competition is high, but it depends who is the client 
as there are frauders and responsible ones: “Actually, there are two types of clients. Ones that take 
money and they know that are not going to return the debt, because they are unethical, irresponsible 
and for these clients it does not matter where to take, they don’t need comparisons, and from the 
other side, there are clients that are conscientious people, and they are ready to pay their loans, 
even though sometimes they might be in dire situations” (expert E). 
Irresponsible lending my MFOs might be another reason for unethical practices. 
Regardless, existing common opinion that MFOs are lending everyone, experts critically disagree 
with this statement: “The common opinion, that MFO lend money to everyone, and then collect 
with unfair ways, is absolutely incorrect. Maybe such kind of practices are not exclusion and were 
common in the past. Nobody wants borrowers that could not return loans” (expert A). Another 
expert goes further and explains that in current situation when the regulator controls MFOs’ 
activities and with various measures tries to protect clients, it is not rational to lend people who 
cannot return loans: “What is interesting, that there is no logic for MFO to lend money to everyone 
when there are limitations for interest rate and fines. Yes, we can propose that with the absence of 
limitations MFO could lend to everyone without looking whether clients are adequate or not, and 
later charge extra at least some part of these high interest rates and fines through courts. However, 
when there are limitations, it is not beneficial for MFO to lend everyone without thorough 
evaluation the creditworthiness of a client (expert B)    
3) Another important topic in the context of ethics is training of managers, how MFOs train 
their employees to moral and ethical standards and values. As managers, agents, and other 
employees are directly responsible for interaction with clients, selection of appropriate people to 
work is very important. Not surprisingly, all experts state that they have well developed steps for 
employees’ training. “First of all, managers are trained what is good and what is bed, how they 
should behave in their interactions with clients. Also, they should possess complete information 
about our product, payments and other conditions of loans” (expert C). Another expert also 
confirmed that they give high importance to the process of future managers training in various 
steps: “Basically, we control managers that are responsible for lending. We have also call center, 
hot line, and optionally we call some clients to get feedback about the quality of service they got 
from managers” (expert D).   
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All experts state that training of managers is firstly directed to the full possessing of all 
necessary information on loans and lending conditions, but employees are motivated for self-
education and leadership talents development as well. MFOs also check managers moral values, 
which kind of problems they might have, and psychology as well: “First, we choose ethical people, 
look their psychology, how they behave. After we test stress steadiness. Also, the atmosphere is 
different in our company, we have very calm working environment. There is no aggression and 
we exclude people that like to use power (expert E). 
As we can see, MFOs are more motivated to filter and hire more responsible, balanced, 
and ethical people to work in their companies, which is accompanied with regular trainings, 
transfer of core values of the company to new employees and controlling: “We completely control 
the quality of our employees. The department for audio control now consists of almost 60 people, 
3 couches, and they all are engaged only in controlling managers’ interaction with clients” (expert 
F). 
4) Next topic discussed with interviewees relates to the regulation of the industry by Bank 
of Russia. The main attention was directed to the measures and limitations Bank of Russian set 
during the last few years as well as ones that it is going to impose in near future. Also, with 
interviewees were discussed issues that the state regulation solves by imposing specific limitations, 
factors that might harm the sustainability of the industry and experts’ opinions toward the 
regulation by Bank of Russia as mega-regulator.  
The main insight that was the opposite of our expectations, is that experts show sympathy 
toward the policy that Bank of Russia has implementing in the industry and believe that it was 
necessary. All experts that represent MFOs, regardless their subjective opinions on distinct 
regulation tools and measures, agree that the regulation by Bank of Russia mostly solves the 
problems it supposed to manage with various limitations as well as helps to rise the image of the 
industry.    
One of the expert states, that MFOs are business units and their main goal is to earn 
maximum profit, and regulation is needed to set limits on this desire and prevent customers from 
unscrupulous behavior of MFOs: “every business unit is concerned to earn maximum profit, it is 
the nature of any business no matter the industry. Other thing is how businesses will earn their 
profit and in which ways, And here, the need of regulation increases. If we compare the norms of 
behavior it is the duty of the police to control and to protect the citizens, while in financial market 
in place of police it becomes Bank of Russia that should regulate the market” (expert C). Another 
expert goes further and shows why policy of Bank of Russia is mostly beneficial for the industry: 
“Regarding the limitations on daily interest rate, overall indebtedness, penalties, I can say that till 
now these measures are in scope of rationality and right. These measures are not harming the 
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economy of MFOs yet, rather help you to stay in a tone, motivate business processes, to think 
when and where you can cut your costs more efficiently” (expert D). One of the main limitations 
Bank of Russia is setting is the maximum size of interest rate, the measure that prevent 
unscrupulous MFOs charging exploitative interest rates: “The measure of interest rate, for 
example, is a good tool both for MFO and the Regulator to control the interest rate, and prevent 
MFOs from charging different rate 5%, 3%, 2%. Also, this measure prevents some greedy MFOs 
to charge exploitative rates” (expert F)   
In February of current year during the yearly conference of “FinFin”40, Bank of Russia 
presented its new suggestions regarding the main limitations that exist for MFOs. These limitations 
comprise such measures as maximum size of daily interest rate (up to 1% from 2019), marginal 
indebtedness of a client (rule of 3x, 2x, 1,5x etc.), overall amount of debt (rule of 3x, 2x, etc.). 
The experts think that these requirements and limitations Bank of Russia is imposing on 
participants might be non-effective and even harm both MFOs as well as clients as end users. As 
one of experts points out: “When Bank of Russia sets extra limitations and various requirements 
on MFOs, it indirectly increases interest rate that MFOs charge from customers. To put these 
expenses in figures, we can say that in 2017 Bank of Russia costed MFOs 0,3-0,5% increase in 
per day interest rate, which means that the cost of credit is increasing correspondingly” (expert B). 
Another expert also agrees that the regulation and measures should be rational and do not harm 
MFOs and he industry: “We can say that overall, the limitations of Bank of Russia are justified, 
and till now these limitations are rational, since the regulation gives right order and image to the 
industry, the thing is the size of the regulation” (expert D). The third expert believes that setting 
of stricter limitations is not justified in very short term, since MFOs could have time to respond 
these changes: “Setting 1% a day interest rate is a very cardinal change in very short time, which 
requires change in economy and business processes by MFOs” (expert F). The same expert 
continues: “We can conclude, that such a policy is not good for final customer. These measures 
are supposed to be for clients’ protection and rise of financial inclusion, but at the end they might 
harm lots of scrupulous people who will be taken final chance of solving some problems of their 
lives” (expert F). Finally, the third expert states that “If Bank of Russia has not set these limitations, 
interest rates would have even gone down”.  
Hence, we can see from the answers that such a policy with radical measures might harm 
companies and force them to go illegal.    
Regarding the reasons and the motives that force Bank of Russian to impose stricter 
limitations on MFOs, the experts also have common opinions. First common pattern in their views 
                                                 
40 http://finfin.rmcenter.ru/#about 
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is that the experts are not completely grasp the rationale behind this policy: “Honestly, it is difficult 
for me to judge about the effectiveness of such policy” (expert C). In addition, the experts think 
that such strict regulation might be result of political pressure. The debates on so called “usury 
interest rates” are topic of debate among politicians for many years, and many deputies of the 
parliament criticize harshly MFOs. This is one of the reasons that the political pressure might work 
through Bank of Russia’ limitations: “I think it is a result of political pressure regarding the size 
of the interest rate, mostly a negative reaction from deputies, the customer protection society, who 
hardly grasp how economics works. When such politicians hear high interest rates like 700-800%, 
they think that MFOs just put the difference between interest rate and cost of funding into their 
pockets, but it’s not true” (expert B). Another expert also believes that political pressure is the 
main reason for such kind of regulation: “Why Bank of Russia is doing it, I think it is mostly result 
of political pressures. The government forced to do more actions and to invent something that’s 
why Bank of Russian should think and implement new limitations or offer new products” (expert 
E).   
5) The final major topic for interviews relates to SROs. The main questions asked to 
interviewees had the purpose to understand how SRO could effectively implement its functions, 
whether it is possible for SROs to self-regulate the industry, and also figure out MFOs’ 
representatives attitude toward SROs.  
The experts from SRO indicate in all their answers that SRO is doing everything to prevent 
MFOs from unethical behavior as well as protecting both MFOs’ and clients’ interests. As one of 
the experts mentioned: “SRO from very beginning started the process of preventing unscrupulous 
practices of the industry via standardization and enforcement mechanism” (expert B).    
However, the experts from MFOs are not confident that SROs are implementing their 
duties efficiently. Moreover, some of them don’t see any real value of SRO. But we should state 
that all experts have common opinion that so called “golden balance” is preferable and useful both 
for MFOs and clients: “Theoretically, SROs could regulate the industry, but with the same 
instruments as used Bank of Russia. Why it hasn’t done, because it is evolutionary process and 
SROs cannot change it immediately in one two years. I am sure, that Bank of Russia demonstrates 
quite balanced, objective and open approach” (expert C). Another expert also is also suspicious 
that SROs could self-regulate the industry: “In theory it might work. I know that many lawyers 
make suggestions to Bank of Russian regarding different issues of the industry. More important is 
the balance that SROs and Bank of Russia should keep between the interest of business and interest 
of customers” (expert D).  
Interestingly, some experts indicated not only that SROs and Bank of Russia represent 
different interests, but also gave some insights why MFOs and SROs could not self-regulate the 
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industry as effective as it is doing Bank of Russia: “Maybe SROs could regulate the industry, but 
we should admit that SRO is a corporate institution, while Bank of Russia is a State representative. 
Also, in our country people like orders and regulations from state, and only in this case they obey 
the rules of the game” (expert E). Another expert believes that the effective regulation of the 
industry is in balance of these two institutions: “I think, that there should be balance and symbiosis 
between these two bodies, which have different interests. Surely, some overlapping exists but SRO 
represents the industry and always will protect the interest of participants, while Central Bank 
represents the state and citizens” (expert F).  
Regarding the question whether SROs help participants in the scope of their functions, the 
experts have different opinions. There are ones that think that SRO is doing many things directed 
to the development of the industry: “SROs develop different methodologies for the interaction of 
MFOs and the regulator, also SROs have number of functions such as assistance of MFOs opening, 
helping MFOs to contact potential investors, etc.” (expert E). The others think that SROs are not 
as effective in their actions as they could. “I can’t say that SRO is effective, but I see that they 
want to do something. I didn’t hear that SRO brought any legislation regarding the industry. 
Surely, SRO should protect the industry, otherwise why we need it. SRO also issued standards, 
but it doesn’t work. It remained on the paper, since most of the companies reach to this themselves 
and don’t need it” states expert D in his answers.  
Generally, we can see that MFOs’ representatives do not see that SROs could self-regulate 
the industry via standards, rules of conduct, and think that only balance between functions of SROs 
and that’s of State, is the more optimal option to regulate the industry.  
  
  Survey analysis 
 
As already mentioned, online survey was created to get answers on research questions from 
MFOs to validate and generalize the findings from interviews as well as get new insights from 
respondents. The questionnaire comprises both open-ended and closed-ended questions and 
includes questions regarding main topics discussed in interviews. Moreover, in questionnaire 
majority closed-ended questions were constructed in a way that respondents were offered diverse 
options that they can choose. This was made to eliminate the problem of response time which is 
one of the main drawbacks of open-ended questions. For analysis of survey results, will be used 
both tool of thematic analysis for open-ended questions and mean estimations for 5 points Likert 
scale questions (for example M=3 is an average, and M=3.5, for example, indicates that the 
respondent evaluates certain characteristic, factor or issue as being high, important, positive or 
significant.  
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As we can see below in figure 4.4, from 40 respondents, 33 were from microcredit 
companies, and 7 from microfinance companies. Regarding the portfolio size, 30 respondents were 
from small, 6 from medium, and 4 from large MFOs.     
 
     Figure 4: Organizational type and portfolio size of MFOs 
 
As the target for survey was comprised to only high-level management, the distribution of 
respondents according to their position in their companies was the following: 29 people were 
directors of MFO, 7 were deputy directors of MFO, and 4 were heads of departments. 
    
        Figure 5: Distribution of companies according to the segment 
  
From 40 respondents only 7 stated that their companies are engaged in more than one 
segment. As we can see from figure 4.4, twenty companies are operating in PDL segment, thirteen 
in Installment loans segment and fourteen in Loans to SMEs.  
The first part of the survey includes questions related to the formation of interest rate in 
companies as well as well as questions to check how respondents understand the ethics in their 
decisions regarding interest rates, extra payments and usage of penalties.  
The respondents were asked to specify the share of main components that form interest 
rate for the most popular microloan of their companies. This statistic is important to make 
judgment about rationality and morality of charged interest rates by MFOs. The mean estimations 
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show that the highest share have such components as expenses of personnel (almost 25%), reserve 
deductions (23%), operational expenses (almost 21%). 
 
                    Table 3: Average share of main components in total cost of a popular loan  
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the problem of high interest rates, respondents were asked to evaluate the level 
of interest rate from ethical perspective. The purpose of such question was to grasp how 
participants of the industry perceive level of morality relating to pricing decisions. The pre-
assumption was that depending on the segment, respondents’ answers about the ethical level of 
interest rate should vary from low to high. This expectation comes from the fact that in different 
segments, interest rates differ dramatically due to terms of the loans, business model and business 
processes of MFOs, as well as due to many other reasons.  
For instance, from MFOs that are operating mostly in PDL segment, we expected 
respondents to indicate high interest levels to be ethical, since costs are high in this segment and 
loans are issued for short terms. In contrast, we expected that respondents of MFOs that are mostly 
engaged in Installment loans and SME loans segments, would specify quite low interest rates to 
be ethical.   
The results proved that such expectations were rational and respondents’ answers about 
ethical level of interest rate showed that these levels were proportional to which segment MFOs 
operate in.   
 
    Figure 6: Level of ethical annual interest rates by respondents  
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As we can see from the diagram, 9 respondents mentioned that maximum 25% annual is 
an ethical level. All these respondents are from companies that operate in installment loans and 
SME loans segments. In contrast, respondents that are from MFOs operating in PDL segment 
selected as ethical interest rate level ones that are more than 300% annual.  
What is interesting, eight respondents believe that every level of interest rate is ethical 
when client agrees. Moreover, these respondents are from all segments, which allow us to think 
that there are number of MFOs in the industry that are inclined to set maximum interest rates that 
the current legislation allows. However, we know that under imperfect competition many clients 
might agree to borrow microloans not making rational choices and comparisons, which means that 
from moral perspective MFOs that set high interest rates are not behaving ethically with clients.  
Respondents were also asked about fines and penalties that clients should be charged for 
overdue loans. Sixteen respondents indicated that every violation of the contract must be punished 
by fines, and twenty-four respondents believes that clients should be punished by extra fines only 
if MFOs carry extra expenses for overdue loans. This statistic allows us to think that 40% of 
respondents are inclined to charge fines on clients without considering that these clients might be 
responsible and scrupulous people, who face some temporary difficulties in their lives and cannot 
repay the loan due to objective reasons.  
Regarding abuses that MFOs usually charge extra payments from clients, the respondents 
were asked to specify whether they have extra payments and expenses that are obligatory for 
getting loans. The results show that the majority (24 MFOs) don’t have any additional payments 
for clients aside loan amount and interest rate. The most common additional expenses that 
remaining 16 MFOs require from their clients are mandatory insurance costs, payment for 
prolongation and restructuring of the loans, as well as payment for assessment of property. 
The next topic related to the abuses that some MFOs are irresponsible and lend people who 
are unable to serve their loans and repay the debt according to schedules. In this context, the 
respondents were asked to specify what are the requirements that their companies demand from 
clients to get microloans.  
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     Figure 7: Main requirements for approval of a microloan 
           
As we can see from figure 4.6, among requirements that are necessary for clients to get a 
microloan, age, official income and registration are most common. However, such requirements 
such as correspondence of clients to certain psychological criteria and level of indebtedness of 
clients are mandatory in less than half of MFOs. Even though it is always difficult for managers 
to recognize all psychological characteristics of a potential client without special tools, however 
some MFOs are stubborn to check level of adequacy and accountability of clients. Particularly, 
only nine respondents stated that their companies require clients to correspond to some basic 
psychological criteria. Another requirement is the level of indebtedness of clients, and we can see 
from figure 4.6, that this indicator is mandatory for less than half of MFOs. Overall indebtedness 
of clients is one of the major problems of the industry, and very often MFOs are accused for 
pushing clients to the debt funnel. Moreover, as the problem of high indebtedness is one of the 
ethical issues related to the industry, the regulator imposed special limitations on it.  
Going further with the problem of irresponsible lending practices by MFOs, the 
respondents were asked to specify the approval rate of credits in their companies. The survey 
results showed that in 27 MFOs approval rate is more than 50%, while only in 13 MFOs this rate 
is less than 50%. Moreover, 19 from 27 MFOs have approval rate higher that 70%. These figures 
allow us to think that irresponsible lending concerns might exist in the industry and especially in 
companies that have approval rate more than 70%.  
Another important topic related to unethical practices that exist in the industry is the 
training of managers to ethical standard and moral values. To figure out how MFOs train their 
employees to ethics and more responsible lending, the respondents were asked to indicate the main 
methods their companies use to train employees. 
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     Figure 8: Training and control of employees’ ethical behavior 
    
We can see above that MFOs implement various methods to train and control personnel to 
more ethical standards. The most common means are control of managers interaction with clients, 
hot line for complaints, and mandatory training of employees to ethical standards of companies 
and SROs.   
One of the most important part of the survey is devoted to the most common ethical issues 
that exist in the industry. All major issues and practices that were distinguished after literature 
review, foreign countries experience analysis and interviews, help us to create a group of 11 most 
common ethical problems and practices that MFOs might have. Based on this list, the respondents 
were asked to specify the relevance of each issue in the industry. 
 
     Table 4: Relevance of most common ethical issues in the industry 
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However, we should state that the expected bias from this question was quite high due to 
the fact that the industry participants were asked to evaluate relevance of unethical behavior that 
might refer to their companies as well. As we can see, all issues described in the table above got 
less than 50% relevance, and it supposed from these figures that there are not relevant ethical 
issues in the industry, which is probably not the case.  For this purpose, we would interpret the 
results from table 4.3 not as disruptive of real figures based on mean estimations, but rather from 
comparative and ranking perspective. Hence, as we can see from the table 4.3, the most relevant 
ethical issues in the industry relate to high interest rates, unscrupulous collection practices, lack of 
transparency, irresponsible lending practices by MFOs, not clear explanation of loan conditions to 
clients and aggressive marketing polices.    
The following step was to figure out what are the most common reasons that MFOs could 
practice unethical behavior with clients. Again, the main reasons that were figured out from 
literature review and interview data, were grouped, and the respondents were asked to specify the 
significance of these factors. 
 
     Table 5: Significance of factors that could bring to unethical practices if MFOs 
 
The significance was estimated using the average of 5 points Likert scale, and all factors 
were evaluated according to the percentage respondents gave for each factor. The factors that 
received less than 50%, are not significant, and factors that got 50% and more are considered to 
be significant. As we can see, absence of training personnel, ineffective compensation system, low 
financial literacy of population and absence of alternatives are factors that are significant, and cud 
bring to unethical behavior of MFOs.   
The respondents were also asked to specify the most effective ways how to improve the 
behavior of such MFOs that behave unethically. According to the answers, the most effective 
methods are: (1) ranking system with explicit publications, (2) mandatory training of managers to 
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ethical standards, (3) Regular revisions using tool of “hidden customer”, (4) penalties and 
deprivation of licenses. 
The next block of questions of the survey relates to SROs. Particularly, the respondents 
were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of SRO implementing its functions. As a basis, main 
functions SRO MiR were chosen to create the list of main ones, which were cross-checked with 
the functions of other two SROs (Edinstvo and Alians), and only after final list was created.   
        
     Table 6: How effectively SRO implement its main functions 
     
      
Again, with the results from the question how effectively SROs implement their functions, 
we expected high bias by MFOs regarding the evaluation of SROs functions. The question was 
created with 5 points Likert scale, and the results, based on mean estimations, showed that only 
one function (assistance to MFOs find funding) is implemented not effectively. According to the 
respondent’s evaluation, all other functions SROs are implementing effectively. 
 To reduce this bias, we will interpret the results from comparative and ranking perspective. 
Particularly, from table 4.6 we can see that MFOs evaluate the effectiveness of implementation of 
SROs’ functions dividing into low, medium, high. This allows us to get extra information in which 
aspects SROs are less effective and in which are more effective. This information is important for 
making our suggestions regarding approaches to self-regulation of the industry. 
Finally, the respondents were asked about different limitations and measures Bank of 
Russia have imposed as well as one that is going to set. Overall, the attitude toward the Policy 
Bank of Russia running regarding the regulation of the industry is from negative- to-neutral, 
however the respondents have more critical opinions regarding separate measures Bank of Russia 
want to impose.  
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Table 7: MFOs representatives’ attitude toward measures by Bank of Russia 
Measures Is a consequence of unethical 
behavior of creditors 
Will decrease 
unethical behavior of 
creditors 
Unified limitation of the borrower's 
debt limit (2.5x, 2x, 1.5x) 
No (M=2.3) No (M=2.7) 
Limitation of the daily interest rate of 
1.5% (from 01.07.2019 1% per day) 
No (M=2.6) No (M=2.5) 
Limitation of the full cost of 
consumer loan (FCC) 
No (M=2.9) No (M=2.8) 
Limit on the amount of the penalty 
(not more than 20% per annum or 
0.1% per day) 
Yes (M=3.2) Yes (M=3.1) 
 
The respondents were asked to show their attitude toward several statements regarding the 
measures Bank of Russian imposed. Again, 5-point Likert scale was used, where average is M=3. 
As we can see from the table above, the respondents do not think that the limitations by Bank of 
Russia already imposed and ones that is going to set in near future are consequences of unethical 
behavior of some MFOs. Nor they think that these limitations will prevent MFOs from unethical 
practices. An exception is a limitation on penalties that might be considered by respondents as a 
consequence for unethical behavior of MFOs and as a tool that will prevent such behavior.  
Then the respondents were asked to evaluate the influence of measures Bank of Russia set 
on MFOs’ sustainability by 5-point Likert scale (average is M=3).     
 
Table 8: The influence of measures on MFOs’ sustainability 
Types of Measures Influence on MFOs’ 
sustainability 
Unified limitation of the borrower's debt limit (2.5x, 2x, 1.5x) Negative (M=2.3) 
Limitation of the daily interest rate of 1.5% (from 01.07.2019 1% 
per day) 
Negative (M=2.45) 
Limitation of the full cost of consumer loan (FCC) Negative (M=2.7) 
Limit on the amount of the penalty (not more than 20% per 
annum or 0.1% per day) 
Negative (M=2.95) 
 
As we can see from the table above, the respondents believe that new limitations will harm 
sustainability of MFOs.  
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5.2. Discussion of empirical findings and explicit answers to research questions  
 
The research goal of current study was to explore the possibility of developing self-
regulation approaches for microfinance organizations. To reach the goal two research questions 
were stated.  
The first research question is: 
1. What are the most relevant ethical issues of Russian microfinance organizations 
which may require regulation? 
To answer this research question, the relevant literature was reviewed. The review revealed 
that the most common ethical issues existing in microfinance industry are: lack of competition at 
least in some regions and cities, high interest rates, lack of transparency, irresponsible lending by 
MFOs, overall indebtedness of borrowers, low level of financial literacy.  
Next step was to study both foreign and Russian experience of regulation of the industry 
by using secondary data, which was aimed to find out what are the most common types of unethical 
practices of the industry that need regulation. The results showed that the range of most common 
unethical practices by MFOs that exist both in foreign countries and in Russia, include problems 
such as high interest rates, unscrupulous lending practices, lack of transparency in interaction with 
clients, irresponsible lending by MFOs, non-obedience to SROs standards, lack of flexibility by 
MFOs regarding options of loan prolongation and restructuring, illegal penalties on overdue loans, 
not informing clients about upcoming payments, and aggressive marketing.  
All these problems and practices of unethical behavior were used as a basis for discussion 
during the interviews. According to answers received from industry participants, some of these 
issues that require regulation, were confirmed to exist in current industry, while the others turned 
out to be not relevant. After analysis of interview results, we can state that the most common 
ethical issues of MFOs are remaining unscrupulous lending practices, high interest rates, lack 
of transparency on loan conditions, lack of flexibility by MFOs.  
Then, the aforementioned issues were grouped and asked to MFOs, which evaluated the 
relevance of each in the industry. According to the results, the main unethical issues that still exist 
and need regulation are: (1) unscrupulous lending practices, (2) high interest rates, (3) lack of 
transparency, (4) irresponsible lending by MFOs, (5) aggressive marketing 
Among the reasons that could bring to unethical behavior of MFOs, as survey results 
showed, the following are most significant – absence of regular training of personnel, ineffective 
compensation system of managers, low financial literacy of population and absence of alternatives 
for low-income people to get loans.  
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The second research question is: 
RQ2 – What should be an effective approach to self-regulation of the industry to prevent 
unethical behavior of MFOs? 
To answer this question first the theoretical concept of self-regulation of the industry was 
studied, then the experience of self-regulation in microfinance in foreign countries was reviewed, 
which allowed us to get necessary information to conduct interviews with representatives of MFOs 
and to create survey as well.  
We should state that the initial pre-assumption regarding the most effective approach to 
self-regulation was one with maximal role of SROs and minimal role of state in the process of 
regulation of the industry. We were inclined to think that in high competitive market state 
regulation might be very harmful and self-regulation might be most effective approach to the 
industry. However, the results from both interviews and surveys proved that this approach might 
not be effective and workable to apply to Russian microfinance industry due to several reasons: 
1. SROs are not perceived by MFOs as institutions that could regulate the industry 
setting appropriate limitation and measure that will prevent unethical behavior of participants, 
2. Regardless there are some overlapping functions of SROs and ones of the regulator, 
however, SROs are perceived by participants as a commercial body, which represent the interest 
of the industry, while Bank of Russia mostly represent and protect interests of customers. 
3. SROs do not use properly the enforcement and punishment mechanisms they have 
to prevent MFOs from unethical practices and disobedience to ethical standards, 
4. Low sense of unity among participants of the industry – MFOs don’t act with 
combined efforts and don’t have unified policy toward the development of the industry (free riding 
problem) 
5. Country specific - Russians are law-abiding citizens under centralized state 
regulation, the level of self-disciple and self-regulation is low for Russian business entities, 
6. SRO might regulate the industry; however, the tools would be more or less the same 
as Bank of Russia is using,  
7. State intervention to the industry is justified by the fact that the industry is growing 
dramatically (with 30-40% annual growth) and is not stable for self-regulation. 
 
Therefore, the most effective approach to self-regulation of the industry becomes so called 
“balanced” approach, which implies symbiosis between SROs’ and the regulator’ functions and 
responsibilities directed to the regulation of the industry.  
Both interview and survey results showed that the balance of the regulation between SROs 
and Bank of Russia is, perhaps, the most effective approach. From interviews we have that all 
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MFOs representatives are suspicions that SROs could self-regulate the industry, rather they think 
that SROs and Bank of Russia represent interests of different groups, and only balance approach 
would be the most effective which will allow to protect interests of both clients and MFOs. 
According to the results from survey, from 40 respondents, 37 stated that for the regulation 
of the microcredit industry there should be a competent joint work of SROs and Bank of Russia. 
And only 3 respondents believe that SROs are able to self-regulate the industry without state 
intervention.  
               
                    Figure 9: Bodies that should regulate microfinance industry 
 
In current situation, SROs role is quite low, and there are several important steps toward 
the improvement of self-regulation of the industry that SROs should implement: 
1. Assistance to develop a public position with strong commitment to ethical values 
of SRO and communicate this position to all relevant stakeholders, 
2. Develop a platform for the interaction of MFOs with the regulator, which will allow 
participants to represent their ideas and concerns before any kind of limitations and measures are 
issued,  
3. Develop more effective enforcement and punishment mechanisms that will increase 
obedience of MFOs to standards of SRO, 
4. Assistance in introducing the concept of good and bad performance of MFO. Stop 
defending “the whole market” and defend only good members and blame bad members, 
5. Assistance to develop a method of systematic evaluation of ethical performance 
(audit, surveys, mystery shopping, complaints, etc.) and publishing its results 
6. Develop a system of ethical training for MFOs’ managers which may be used at 
low cost by SRO members  
7. Develop recommendations and guidelines about increasing efficiency of MFOs 
which may allow to reduce interest rates and public pressure on MFOs 
3
37
Who should regulate microfinance industry?
SROs
Bank of Russia
Balanced joint work of
two structures
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8. Develop industry-wide mechanisms that may help to cut costs and reduce interest 
rates (e.g. common big-data solutions for scoring, etc.). 
 
Aside main findings, the current research also provided some other important findings and 
insights: 
1. Unjustified non-benevolent attitude exists toward the whole industry  
2. Generally, MFOs think that ethical issues are not relevant in current microfinance 
industry – the reasons might be the following:  
- MFOs do not grasp ethical nature of issues existing in the industry 
- MFOs understand but do not admit that ethical issues exist in the industry 
- In reality, MFOs think that currently the level of ethical issues is minimum 
in the industry 
3. Unscrupulous behavior of many clients (irresponsible borrowers, swindlers) 
4. Political pressure could decrease the sustainability of MFOs through Central Bank 
strict regulation 
5. High concentration of the industry – only 60 MFC possess 80% of total profit of 
the industry,   
6. Loopholes of current legislation regarding the operations of so called “Black” 
creditors, 
7. Absence of well-established legislation referring to borrowers that will compel 
clients to return taken loans, 
8. The policy by Bank of Russia is directed to the transformation of microfinance 
activities to social business, but the government do not offer any incentives and 
support to MFOs, 
9. Limitations by Bank of Russia will indirectly harm the final users (customers) - 
high interest rates if possible, extra fees, few people can get microloans.  
 
 
5.3. Theoretical and managerial implications 
 
This research paper is dedicated to the identifications of ethical issues and unscrupulous 
practices that exist in microfinance industry, as well as to the search of most effective approach to 
self-regulation of MFOs, which will allow to prevent MFOs from unethical behavior and practices.  
The research results showed that the theory of self-regulation in microfinance industry is 
vulnerable and not applicable due to several reasons: (1) low level of ethical awareness of 
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participants – many MFOs do not grasp fully the ethics of their actions, (2) Free riding problem – 
participants mostly act separately and do not participate in joint actions related to the whole 
industry, (3) presence of mutual information asymmetry – MFOs are not fully aware what SROs 
are doing, and SROs do not possess the necessary information about all participants, (4) absence 
of meetings among participants to share best practices, (5) lack of punishment practices and cases 
by SROs. 
 
Regarding the managerial implications of current study, first MFOs should consider the 
main unethical practices discussed in this research in their operations, trying to minimalize cases 
of such behavior in their companies. Rather they should focus on improving efficiency of business 
processes and change business models constructing on more ethical principles, which will allow 
MFOs to improve the image of their companies and long-run sustainability from one side, and to 
minimalize the effects of strict state regulation in forms of various limitations from other side.  
Second important managerial implication from current study for MFOs should be the 
improvement of personnel training and education of employees to ethical standards, which will 
help MFOs to prevent the common ethical issues of the industry that might arise from unethical 
behavior of employees that directly interact with clients.  
Finally, as the main goal of current study is to the find effective approach to self-regulation 
of the industry, the results of this research might be used by MFOs to understand their role, 
functions and expectations from SROs, what should be their main actions directed to influence on 
the measures and other regulation tools that are used by the regulator. Currently, majority MFOs 
don’t understand their role in the process of self-regulation, and therefore don’t see any value in 
their participation to the process of regulation. This study shows what might be the most effective 
and workable approach to self-regulation, and how MFOs and SROs could, by clarifying their 
positions, jointly represent and protect the interests of participants in interaction with the regulator. 
 
5.4. Limitations and future research 
 
Although the findings of this research have both theoretical and practical implications, 
there are several limitations that should be addressed in the future research. 
First, findings from both interviews and survey are based only on responses of MFOs and 
SRO MiR representatives, which might lead to some distorted results. The answers to the first 
research question are based on the opinions of MFOs’ high management, and there might be bias 
regarding the evaluations and perceptions of ethical issues and unscrupulous practices by MFOs 
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representatives. As we know, all the problems discussed in this study relate to clients and mostly 
clients are ones that suffer from unethical behavior of MFOs.  
Therefore, in order to provide more accurate findings, clients of microfinance 
organizations should be included in further research. 
Second, the sample is taken from only SRO MiR and its member MFOs. Regardless SRO 
MiR is the more active in the industry and comprises MFOs with biggest share of portfolio size, 
however there are two other SROs (Edinstvo and Aliance), that represent remaining MFOs of the 
industry. Even though problem of opinion difference is not high, however for high validity and 
generalizability of findings, it would be better to include representatives of all SROs in further 
research.  
Finally, the representatives of Bank of Russia were not participated in this research due to 
the problem of inaccessibility. The main research questions relate to such topics as ethical issues 
of microfinance industry that are subject for regulation, as well as, self-regulation and regulation 
of the industry. Since Bank of Russian is the mega-regulator of the industry and implements special 
policy and regulation with various limitations, the opinions and evaluations of research related 
topics by representatives of Bank of Russia might bring new explanations and insights to further 
research.  
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Conclusion 
As the main findings were discussed and implicit answers to research questions were given 
in section 5.2, here we would try to summarize the main work done within this research. 
As already stated, the goal of this master thesis was to explore the possibility of developing 
approaches to self-regulation of microfinance organizations.  
For this purpose, theoretical background of regulation and self-regulation was studied first 
in foreign countries, then in Russia, which was aimed to determine a range of potential unethical 
behavior of MFOs that need regulation. The study of secondary data regarding above mentioned 
tasks, revealed that the most common unethical issues that exist both in Russian and in foreign 
countries are: low level of financial literacy of consumers, invasive marketing strategy by many 
MFOs, non-purposeful borrowing, lack of transparency by many MFOs, high interest rates and 
fines, lack of alternative sources of financing for many citizens, and lack of control on discloser 
of credit conditions. 
Going further two research tools were chosen: (1) in-depth interviews with SRO MiR and 
MFOs representatives, and (2) online survey among MFOs. The empirical results proved that the 
main unethical issues that need regulation are: unscrupulous lending practices, high interest 
rates, lack of transparency on loan conditions, lack of flexibility by MFOs, and aggressive 
marketing by MFOs. 
Regarding the most effective approach to self-regulation of the industry, the results of 
research showed, that self-regulation of the industry without state intervention is not applicable to 
Russian microfinance industry due to several reasons: (1) SROs are not perceived by MFOs as 
institutions that could regulate the industry setting appropriate limitations, (2) SROs are perceived 
by participants as a commercial body, which represent the interest of the industry, while Bank of 
Russia mostly represent and protect interests of customers, (3) SROs do not use properly the 
enforcement and punishment mechanisms they have to prevent MFOs from unethical practices, 
(4) Low sense of unity among participants of the industry, and etc.   
Hence, the more effective approach to self-regulation of current industry is balanced 
approach, which implies that SROs and Bank of Russia jointly regulate the industry – SROs 
mostly should represent and protect the interest of MFOs, while Bank of Russia is mostly inclined 
to protect the interests of customers.   
However, currently SROs role is quite low, and there are several important steps (stated in 
section 5.2), that SROs should implement to improve their approaches to self-regulation of the 
industry.   
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Appendix 1: Guiding questions for in-depth interviews with Russian 
Microfinance Center and Self-Regulated Organization MiR representatives 
 
 
1. Who did initiate the creation of the RMC in 2002 and for what purpose? Were there 
problems at the time with the unfair behavior of individual MFOs or unethical behavior toward 
clients? Did RMC deal with these problems? 
 
2. NAUMIR was established in 2006 for the political representation of microfinance 
interests. Did somehow exist the problem of the unfair behavior of individual MFIs at that time? 
Were NAUMIR and RMC engaged in this problem from 2006 to 2011? 
 
3. How necessary was the Law of 2010? Could have the industry existed without it or not? 
Has this law helped to regulate the unfair behavior of MFOs and their managers? Did the law 
create any inconvenient or ineffective norms? 
 
4. In 2011, the NP MiR was created - for what purpose? What kind of problems of 
dishonest behavior did exist at that period and how they were solved by the MiR from 2011 to 
2015? 
 
5. Can you tell the history of the development and adoption of the Code of Ethics in 2013 
is of interest? 
 
6. History of the introduction of gradual restrictions on the interest rate, indebtedness, etc. 
in 2015-2017. - Has SRO MiR tried to somehow prevent this regulation? What were the reasons 
for the regulator's decision to introduce new restrictions? 
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Appendix 2: Guiding questions for in-depth interviews with microfinance 
organizations’ representatives 
 
1. Can you, please, tell a few words about the history of the company 
 
2. Please, describe the general characteristics of business and strategy of your company. 
 
3. How does your company understand the ethics of relationship with a client? 
 
4. What are the main types of unethical behavior that exist on the market and what are the 
reasons? 
 
5. How does the company train and supervise its managers to avoid unethical behavior? 
 
6. Are the efforts of SRO MiR sufficient for SRO to self-regulate the industry? 
 
7. Is Bank of Russia regulating the industry in right direction (limiting interest rates, setting 
marginal indebtedness size, etc.) 
 
8. What could SRO do to perfect its role in the process of self-regulation of the industry? 
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Appendix 3: Questions from survey that were used in the process of analysis 
 
1.  What kind of microfinance organization is your company? 
• MFC 
• MCC 
2. In which market segment does your company operate? 
• Pay Day Loans 
• Installment loans 
• Microloans to SMEs 
3. Please indicate the approximate amount of your company's loan portfolio 
• 0-150 mln rubles 
• 151-600 mln rubles 
• 601 mln rubles and more 
4. What position do you occupy in the company? 
• Director 
• Deputy Director 
• Head of department 
5. Please indicate the approximate share of the following components in the interest rate for 
the most popular microloan in your company in percentage. 
• Funding expenses 
• Operational expenses 
• Personnel expenses 
• Expenses for collection of overdue debt 
• Profit margin 
6. What, in your opinion, is the unethical (unjust) interest rate level in relation to the client? 
• No more than 25% annually 
• No more than 50% annually 
• No more than 100% annually 
• No more than 200% annually 
• No more than 300% annually 
• No more than 500% annually 
• No more than 700% annually 
• No more than 800% annually 
• Any level of interest rates that the borrower will agree to is ethical (fair) 
7. In which case should a client be fined? 
• Any breach of contract must be punished with a fine 
• It is necessary to apply penalties only when the MFI incurs additional costs from 
violation of the terms of the contract 
8. How should the fine be determined? 
• The size of the fine must correspond to the additional costs of the MFI from the 
client violating the terms of the contract 
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• The penalty is an additional source of profit for MFIs and is determined by the 
ability of customers to pay this penalty. 
9. Please indicate how much, on average, is the percentage of approved loans in percentages 
in your company? 
10. Please indicate in what ways your company maintains relations with the borrower? 
11. Often, accusations of unethical behavior are heard against MFOs, but it is difficult for 
society to understand the validity of these allegations. Please rate, as an expert, as far as 
the following charges are true:  
(1- relevant for less than 20% of MFOs, 2 – relevant for 20-40% of MFOs, 3 – relevant 
for roughly half of MFOs, 4- relevant for 60-80% of MFOs, 5 – relevant for more than 
80% of MFOs) 
• High interest rate 
• Lack of transparency on loan conditions 
• Not clear explanation of loan conditions to a client 
• Lending to clients with low creditworthiness 
• Unscrupulous collection practices 
• Disobedience to SROs’ standards 
• Absence of option for loan prepayment 
• Absence of loan restructuring options 
• Not informing clients on upcoming payments 
• Illegal penalties on overdue loans 
• Aggressive marketing 
12. Please rate the importance of factors that may cause unethical behavior of MFOs: 
(1- Absolutely insignificant, 2 - insignificant, 3 – neutral, 4- significant, 5 - Absolutely 
significant) 
• High competitions, fast growth and fight market share 
• Pressure of investors to demonstrate high grow indexes 
• Absence of regular training personnel 
• Ineffective compensation system of managers 
• Low financial literacy of population 
• Absence of alternatives for low-income people to get loans 
• Absence of competitions in many regions 
13. In what ways, in your opinion, can the behavior of those MFIs that behave insufficiently 
ethically be improved? 
14. Please rate how effective is the SRO, of which your company is a member, carrying out 
its activities in each of the following areas? 
(1- Absolutely not effective, 2 – not effective, 3 – in half cases ineffective, 4- effective, 5 
- Absolutely effective, 0- do not possess information) 
• Assistance to increase legal literacy of population 
• Assistance to increase financial literacy of population 
• Fight against “grey” market 
• Responding to costumers’ complaints and protecting their rights 
• Assistance to increase of transparency by MFOs 
• Assistance MFOs finding financing 
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• Development of ethical standards of conduct for MFOs 
• Participation in creation of legislation that represents rights of MFOs 
• Regular checkups to prevent unethical practices of MFOs  
• Assistance to MFOs with training of managers to ethical standards 
15. Please rate how each of the following constraints affects the financial stability of an 
MFOs: 
(1- Absolutely negative, 2 – negative, 3 – average, 4- positive, 5 - Absolutely positive) 
• Unified limitation of the borrower's debt limit (2.5x, 2x, 1.5x) 
• Limitation of the daily interest rate of 1.5% (from 01.07.2019 1% per day) 
• Limitation of the full cost of consumer loan (FCC) 
• Limit on the amount of the penalty (not more than 20% per annum or 0.1% per day) 
16. In general, how much do you agree with the Bank of Russia policy on the regulation of 
the microfinance market? 
(absolutely disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – average, 4- agree, 5 - absolutely agree) 
17. Who should regulate the market for microloans? 
• Self-Regulated Organizations 
• State regulator 
• Harmonized balanced joint work of these two bodies 
18. If you have additional comments about the issues discussed above, please write them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
